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WILLFUL BLINDNESS: FEDERAL AGENCIES’ 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REGULATORY 
FLEXIBILITY ACT’S PERIODIC REVIEW 
REQUIREMENT—AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 
TO INVIGORATE THE ACT 
Michael R. See∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
We live in the age of the bureaucracy.  Whether we realize it or not, 
federal agencies regulate every aspect of our daily lives, including: the 
cloth in our beds;1 the fuel for our cars;2 the way we are paid;3 and the 
ingredients in the food we eat.4  The federal administrative system has the 
power to dictate to American business how things are done and officials 
have not hesitated to exercise their power.  Recognizing that this wide-
ranging power comes with responsibility, Congress passed the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (RFA) in 19805
 
∗ Michael See is a federal regulatory attorney with the American Petroleum Institute in 
Washington, D.C.  Prior to joining API, Mr. See served for four years as Assistant Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy for the U.S. Small Business Administration where he oversaw 
compliance by federal agencies with the Regulatory Flexibility Act.  The views expressed in 
this article are his alone, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the American 
Petroleum Institute, the Office of Advocacy or the Small Business Administration. 
 to ensure that regulators take into account 
the individual rights of ordinary small businessmen and women while 
 1. See, e.g., Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 13,472 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633). 
 2. See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle 
Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 6,698 (Feb. 
10, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 80, 85, 86). 
 3. See, e.g., Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, 
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541). 
 4. See, e.g., Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP); Procedures for the 
Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. 6,138 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 120). 
 5. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1981) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612), amended by Subtitle II of the Contract with America 
Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996). 
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achieving the policy goals that the legislature has dictated.  One of the 
ways the RFA did this was through section 610, which requires federal 
agencies to periodically review existing rules and consider reducing the 
regulatory burden on small business. 
Unfortunately, over the past twenty-five years, federal regulators have 
often ignored section 610 and have not conducted periodic reviews of their 
rules.  Even those agencies which review some of their existing rules under 
section 610 rarely act in response to their reviews.  Most of these agencies 
comply with the letter of the law for only a small percentage of their rules, 
and they rarely take action beyond publishing a brief notice in the Federal 
Register.  Ironically, when regulators conduct periodic reviews under 
section 610, they are far more likely to increase the burden of regulation on 
small entities than to reduce it.6
Essentially, since Congress’s order to the federal bureaucracy twenty-
five years ago to continuously assess the proper balance between regulatory 
goals and the economic burden on small business, the bureaucracy has 
responded by ignoring this mandate. Today, Congress is revisiting the 
history of agency non-compliance and defiance in the face of its order, and 
is considering legislation to ensure that agencies no longer feel secure 
regulating the public in perpetuity.
 
7
This Article first explains the basic requirements of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, and in particular focuses on the periodic review 
requirement contained in section 610.  It then shares the results of research 
on agency implementation rates of section 610 of the Act and discusses the 
problems with agency implementation.  Finally, it highlights potential 
solutions to agency noncompliance, and proposes the adoption of three 
amendments to the RFA: the proposed legislation in the House of 
Representatives and Senate, which would amend section 610 of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act, and two additional amendments, which target 
problems that are not addressed in the currently pending legislation. 
 
II. THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT 
A. What is the Regulatory Flexibility Act? 
1. The RFA 
During the Carter Administration, public attention turned towards a 
 
 6. See infra Part III.B. 
 7. See infra Part V. 
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number of actions by the federal agencies which inflicted widespread harm 
on an already fragile economy.8
[E]ndeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable 
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of 
the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.  To achieve this principle, agencies are required to solicit and 
consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for their 
actions to assure that such proposals are given serious consideration.
  Congress responded in 1980 with the 
RFA, the express purpose of which was to make agencies: 
9
The RFA is designed to ensure that agencies consider how their rules 
will affect small entities.
 
10  A federal agency must determine whether a rule 
will result in a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities,” and if so, must conduct regulatory flexibility analyses to 
accompany its proposed and final rules.11  The agency’s analysis must 
include estimates of the impact the rule could have and “a description of 
the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact 
on small entities consistent with the stated objectives of applicable 
statutes,” along with the factual, policy, and legal reasons behind the 
alternative selected.12
While the RFA may seem to be a simple procedural hurdle, requiring 
only that the agency publish analyses,
 
13
 
 8. During the debate over the RFA, Rep. Andrew Ireland discussed abuses of small 
entities by federal agencies, including a gas station owner who spent 600 hours filling out 
federal reporting forms and a businessman who chose to pay a $500 fine (1979 dollars) 
rather than fill out a sixty-three foot-long federal reporting form.  126 CONG. REC. H. 24, 587 
(1980).  Later research seemed to confirm these Congressional concerns, including one 
study by a prominent economist that determined that “about 30 percent of the decline in 
productivity growth in manufacturing during the 1970’s may be attributable to [OSHA and 
EPA] regulation.”  Wayne B. Gray, The Cost of Regulation: OSHA, EPA and the 
Productivity Slowdown, 77 AMER. ECON. REV. 998 (1987).  It is not surprising that public 
attention turned towards regulation, as many of the statutes from which costly federal 
regulation stems was passed in the 1970s.  See Barry A. Pineles, The Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act: New Options in Regulatory Relief, 5 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 29, 29-30 (1997) (providing an excellent discussion of the statutory 
underpinnings of the call for regulatory reform that led to the RFA). 
 this analysis is the only statutorily-
 9. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (“Findings and Purposes”). 
 10. For a masterful overview of the RFA, its goals for small business, and its 
achievements and failures, see the article by Keith Holman in this issue of the Fordham 
Urban Law Journal.  Keith W. Holman, The Regulatory Flexibility Act at 25: Is the Law 
Achieving Its Goal?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. XX (2006). 
 11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 605(b) (certification), 603 (initial regulatory flexibility analysis), 604 
(final regulatory flexibility analysis). 
 12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 604. 
 13. See, e.g., U.S. Cellular Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 254 F. 3d 78, 88 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (“Purely procedural, however, RFA section 604 requires nothing more than that 
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required, judicially reviewable agency determination on how the agency 
will deal with small entities.  Prior to the passage of the RFA, agencies 
were under no statutory obligation to even consider regulatory alternatives 
that could reduce the harm they did to the most vulnerable of regulated 
entities.  Disproportionate regulatory impacts and agency refusal to 
acknowledge the concerns of small entities were the norm prior to the 
passage of the RFA.14
2. Section 610 of the RFA 
  The RFA operates, in conjunction with the APA and 
other procedural protections, to confer a procedural right that appears 
almost substantive—that is, the right to prevent agencies from harming 
small entities arbitrarily. 
Section 610 of the RFA requires agencies to review a rule within ten 
years of the date of its publication for small entity impacts.  The RFA 
instructs agencies to the following effect: 
In reviewing rules to minimize any significant economic impact of the 
rule on a substantial number of small entities in a manner consistent with 
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, the agency shall consider the 
following factors— 
(1) the continued need for the rule; 
(2) the nature of complaints or comments received concerning the 
rule from the public; 
(3) the complexity of the rule; 
(4) the extent to which the rule overlaps, duplicates or conflicts with 
other Federal rules, and, to the extent feasible, with State and local 
governmental rules; and 
(5) the length of time since the rule has been evaluated or the degree 
to which technology, economic conditions, or other factors have 
changed in the area affected by the rule.15
Agencies are also required to publish notice in the Federal Register of 
their intent to perform reviews: 
 
Each year, each agency shall publish in the Federal Register a list of the 
rules which have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities, which are to be reviewed pursuant to this section during 
 
the agency file a FRFA [Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis] demonstrating a ‘reasonable, 
good-faith effort to carry out [RFA’s] mandate.’” (second bracket in orig.)). 
 14. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 3 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2790; see 
Holman, supra note 8, at XX (explaining the need for the Act in defending the rights of 
small businesses and discussing its recent successes). 
 15. 5 U.S.C. § 610(b) (2005). 
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the succeeding twelve months. The list shall include a brief description of 
each rule and the need for and legal basis of such rule and shall invite 
public comment upon the rule.16
Most agencies began publishing their section 610 lists and notices in the 
semi-annual Unified Agenda publications in the mid-1990s.
 
17
According to section 610 of the RFA, the express purpose of the 
periodic review requirement is “to determine whether such rules should be 
continued without change, or should be amended or rescinded, consistent 
with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, to minimize any significant 
economic impact of the rules upon a substantial number of such small 
entities.”
 
18  Congress was explicit in its aims in passing section 610, not 
only placing that purpose within the section itself, but declaring that the 
purpose of the section 610 review is to “to determine whether the rules and 
regulations of the agency are efficiently and equitably achieving the 
legislative goals under which they are promulgated.”19
In 1998, Congress revisited the RFA with a bill that would have 
amended section 610, the Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997 (which was 
referred to in a Senate Report as the Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1998).
 
20  The bill would have reduced the time period of periodic review 
from ten years to five, and would have required agencies to publish legal 
and factual determinations upon conclusion of section 610 review, 
establishing a judicially reviewable administrative record for an agency’s 
decision to leave a rule in place.21
 
 16. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c). 
  The bill stemmed from a perceived 
failure on the part of federal agencies to implement section 610, 
congressional frustration with the lack of periodic review, and the intent to 
 17. There was, however, no one place the public could go to see all the rules for which 
agencies had published notice of review under section 610.  Then, in the fall of 1997, the 
Unified Agenda started publishing an index with all the section 610 notices for that issue.  
62 Fed. Reg. 58,557 (Oct. 29, 1997).  Since then, each publication has included an 
Appendix A, “Index to Entries that Agencies Have Designated for Section 610 Review.” 
 18. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2005). 
 19. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 15 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2802.  In 
2005, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce underlined this purpose by sending a 
letter to the heads of ten federal agencies demanding proof of compliance with what it 
described as “the only crosscutting statutory requirement through which federal agencies 
reexamine certain rules after they have been issued.”  Letter from Joe Barton, Chairman, 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to Heads of Ten Federal Agencies (Apr. 4, 
2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Letters/04052005_1501.htm. 
 20. Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997, S. 981, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998). 
 21. Id. The relevant subsection heading under section 632 is: Advisory committee on 
regulations.  Id; see also Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998, S. REP. NO. 105-188, at 56-
58 (1998). 
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confer “the benefits intended by Congress in 1980.”22  This bill, however, 
was ultimately not passed.23
Section 610 reflects Congress’s explicit decision to act, even though 
then-President Carter had acted with his Executive authority to require the 
same periodic review from agencies.
 
24
(a) the continued need for the regulation; 
(b) the type and number of complaints or suggestions received; 
(c) the burdens imposed on those directly or indirectly affected by the 
regulations; 
(d) the need to simplify or clarify language; 
(e) the need to eliminate overlapping and duplicative regulations; and 
(f) the length of time since the regulation has been evaluated or the degree 
to which technology, economic conditions or other factors have changed 
in the area affected by the regulation.
  Executive Order 12,044, signed by 
President Carter, required agencies to consider both the costs of new 
regulations to small business (as the RFA later would), and to “periodically 
review their existing regulations,” considering: 
25
This Executive Order was in place and functioning for a full two years 
before Congress considered the RFA.  The legislators who voted for the 
RFA were fully aware of Executive Order 12,044, addressing  it in a Senate 
Report which stated that the order was insufficient to protect the rights of 
small entities because it was “not subject to judicial review and the order is 
not permanent law but may be rescinded by the President at any time,” and 
because “[a]dherence to the order by the independent regulatory 
agencies . . . is completely voluntary.”
 
26
Despite sitting under a President who shared the goals of the RFA and 
ordered his agencies to perform the RFA’s periodic review, Congress 
nonetheless decided that the periodic review provision was so important 
that it should be required by statute, with a provision for judicial review, 
and that it should be applicable to every federal regulatory agency. 
 
As discussed below, President George W. Bush has made efforts to 
review some federal rules.27
 
 22. S. REP. NO. 105-188, at 57 (1998). 
  It is unclear whether the current Congress will 
decide to defer to the Executive branch’s existing efforts to retain a free 
hand while reviewing regulations, or to act firmly in amending section 610 
 23. Library of Congress, Thomas, List of All Congressional Actions Regarding S. 981, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). 
 24. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978). 
 25. Id. at 12,663. 
 26. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 8 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2795. 
 27. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text. 
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to create a functional and enforceable periodic review requirement.  What 
is clear is that the reformers of the 96th Congress28
B.   The Importance of Periodic Review 
 ultimately chose not to 
make reasonable regulation contingent on the continuing good will of the 
nation’s Chief Executive. 
Periodic review of rules is not merely an academic construct or a dry, 
procedural hurdle.  The review of existing regulations is significant because 
of the real world consequences of failure to do so, like the “ratchet 
effect.”29
1. The Ratchet Effect 
  Because of such consequences, regulatory reviews have been 
supported for various reasons for more than twenty-five years within the 
executive branch, with results indicating that such reviews are not only 
feasible, but also advisable from a regulatory burden-reduction standpoint. 
The main problem addressed by periodic review of existing agency 
regulation is the “ratchet effect.”  Like a ratchet, regulation has the 
tendency to move in one direction only—that is, becoming more 
restrictive.30
 
 28. Interestingly, the refusal to defer to the executive branch did not result from party 
politics, and the RFA was not approved by Congress on strict party lines.  During the 96th 
Congress, the House of Representatives, which passed the bill on a voice vote, was 
comprised of 277 Democrats and 158 Republicans, and was presided over by Speaker of the 
House Thomas “Tip” O’Neil (D-Mass.).  Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Congressional History, 
  In some areas of regulation, such as health, safety, and 
environmental rules, when technological advances indicate that benefits are 
available, the government will regulate.  In addition, some statutes, such as 
http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
2006).Similarly, the Senate was divided 58-41-1 with a Democratic majority.  U.S. Senate, 
Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, 
http://senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Apr. 
13, 2006).  Of course, President Carter, who signed the RFA on September 19, 1980, was 
also a Democrat, and fully intended to remain in the White House for a second term to live 
with the consequences of the RFA.  The members of the 96th Congress truly earned the title 
of “reformers,” as they voted to impose checks on the Executive’s power at a time when 
their party held the White House, thus reducing their own party’s political power. 
 29. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 30. Professional academics and advocates are quick to point out a handful of specific 
examples of politically-motivated actions which reduced regulatory burdens or minimized a 
proposed increase in those burdens.  It is instructive, however, to consider that the Code of 
Federal Regulations currently amounts to more than 100,000 pages of federal rules. Both 
the author and the knowledgeable reader would likely find themselves hard-pressed to 
identify more than a few individual sections per year for which sufficient political support 
existed to actually reduce regulatory burdens below existing levels. 
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the Safe Drinking Water Act, do not allow agencies to reduce regulatory 
requirements,31
The problem of the ratchet effect is not an academic or hypothetical 
construct; it occurs on a regular basis in large, expensive rulemakings by 
federal agencies.  One prominent example of the ratchet effect in action 
was the recent rulemaking by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
limiting diesel particulate matter emissions from nonroad diesel engines 
(e.g., bulldozers, generators, and other construction equipment).
 causing the regulatory agency to set the previous regulation 
as the “baseline,” below which it does not consider the impact of its 
actions.  Even without statutory mandates, many agencies set the existing 
burdens they impose on the public as the baseline for regulation whenever 
they consider additional requirements.  Thus, while these new requirements 
may have only minor incremental effects, the regulation as a whole 
imposes major economic burdens on the regulated community.  Finally, 
even businesses that expend capital on one-time improvements are 
sometimes reluctant to see burden reductions, as these expenditures can 
operate as barriers to entry and reduce competition for existing market 
players.  This is the ratchet effect—the natural tendency of agency officials 
charged with achieving public benefits to focus on pursuing those benefits 
and not on reducing the burdens of their regulation to the public. 
32  In that 
rulemaking, EPA amended an original rule published in 1994 that limited 
emissions from nonroad diesel engines.33  This fourth “tier,” or round, of 
emissions reductions (“the tier IV amendments”) was set to lower 
emissions from the levels set by previous emissions reduction rules and 
would require large capital and equipment expenditures by engine and 
equipment manufacturers.34  The rule did not consider the overall costs 
EPA had imposed on regulated entities in all four tiers of regulation, and it 
did not balance those costs against the actions it had previously taken.35
 
 31. Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1662 (1974) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(9)). 
  
 32. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 
Fed. Reg. 38,958, 38,960 (June 29, 2004) (amending Control of Air Pollution; 
Determination of Significance for Nonroad Sources and Emission Standards for New 
Nonroad Compression-Ignition Engines At or Above 37 Kilowatts, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306 
(June 17, 1994)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Nonroad Diesel-Tier 4 
Final Rule, http://www.epa.gov/nonroad-diesel/2004fr.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
 35. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR EPA 
RULEWRITERS: REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT AS AMENDED BY THE SMALL BUSINESS 
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FAIRNESS ACT 82-83 (1999), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/sbrefa/documents/iguid99.pdf [hereinafter EPA, REVISED INTERIM 
GUIDANCE] (guidance document for EPA rule writers stating that the determinative factor 
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Instead, the rule measured the incremental costs of the Tier IV 
amendments, and considered alternatives to the amendment in process.36  
The EPA has not published a notice of periodic review for its 1994 rule, as 
required by the RFA and the EPA’s own procedures.37  Further, the 
amendments to the original emissions restrictions have not considered 
alternatives by balancing costs and benefits for reducing the existing 
burdens imposed by the 1994 rule.38  The amendment of the existing rule 
did not trigger a public review of the previous rule’s requirements and 
justification.  The short conclusion to be drawn is that EPA considers its 
regulation of the public as a one-way street.39
2.   Historical Recognition by the President of the Importance of Periodic 
Review of Rules 
 
For more than twenty-five years, the periodic review of existing rules 
has been supported by both Republican and Democratic Administrations.  
As discussed below, every president since President Carter has imposed 
either a temporary moratorium on regulation or a general review of existing 
regulation to identify individual candidates for reform, and some have 
 
for whether section 610 review is required for a rule that was subsequently amended is 
whether amendment eliminated the rule’s impacts). 
 36. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 
Fed. Reg. at 39,145-49; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 
CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NONROAD DIESEL ENGINES ch.6 (2004), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/nonroad-diesel/2004fr/420r04007.pdf [hereinafter EPA, CONTROL OF 
EMISSIONS]. 
 37. Though the rule was superceded by later additional regulation, EPA policy is not to 
review a rule unless subsequent rulemaking eliminates the first rule’s impacts.  See EPA, 
REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 35, at 82-83.  The problem of when an agency must 
review rules that are subsequently amended is discussed later in this paper. 
 38. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 
Fed. Reg. at 39,159-62; Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel 
Engines, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,968, at 56,977-983, 56,992-993 (Oct. 23, 1998). 
 39. The EPA cannot claim that it had no choice under the Clean Air Act (CAA) but to 
impose the regulatory burdens it did.  While it is true that section 213 of the CAA instructs 
the Administrator of EPA to implement standards for nonroad mobile nitrogen oxide 
emissions that “achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable,” the CAA also 
provides in the same sentence that the Administrator shall only do so, “giving appropriate 
consideration to the cost of applying such technology within the period of time available to 
manufacturers and to noise, energy, and safety factors.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (2000).  
Further, the “shall” is removed from the similar instructions to the Administrator pertaining 
to regulation of particulate matter; thus, the EPA “may” regulate emissions of particulate 
matter (the main culprit in the 2004 rulemaking), but only after considering “costs, noise, 
safety, and energy factors.”  42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(4).  Thus, although EPA has a clear 
congressional mandate to regulate the emissions that nonroad diesel rules were designed to 
reduce, it has an equally clear order to adequately balance the costs of said regulation 
against the emissions reduction benefits sought. 
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instituted both approaches.  Every administration since Reagan’s has 
committed the executive branch to a systematic review of all new rules for 
costs and benefits, and has implemented special procedures for the review 
of some existing rules. 
a. Temporary Regulatory Moratoriums and General Reviews 
Since the Carter Administration, three of five presidents have imposed 
regulatory moratoriums on federal agencies, and every administration has 
engaged in general reviews of existing regulations to identify candidates 
that are ripe for reform.  As discussed above, in 1978, President Carter 
signed Executive Order 12,044, which for the first time committed federal 
agencies to periodically reviewing their existing regulations.40
On assuming office in 1981, one of President Reagan’s first actions was 
to delay the effective date of the previous administration’s last-minute 
regulatory actions.  His Executive Order 12,291 and memorandum to the 
heads of federal agencies ordered agencies to delay the effective dates of 
the proposed rules for sixty days.
  This 
marked the first executive action aimed at reviewing rules on systematic 
bases after their promulgation, with the goal of reducing unnecessary 
regulatory burdens. 
41  As discussed below, this order also 
required for the first time the review of some regulations by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) prior to their publication.42
Then, in 1992, President George H.W. Bush imposed a moratorium on 
all regulatory actions by his own administration, ordering all regulatory 
actions to be withheld from publication as final rules for ninety days.
 
43  
During this time, the President ordered agencies to identify rules that 
imposed substantial costs on the economy, and weigh those costs against 
the rules’ benefits, to ensure that the “expected benefits to society of any 
regulation should clearly outweigh the expected costs it imposes on 
society.”44  President Bush then extended this ninety-day moratorium 
another 120-days.45
 
 40. Exec. Order No. 12,044, at § 4, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,663 (Mar. 23, 1978). 
  From January 28 through October 28, 1992, federal 
 41. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Memorandum for the 
Heads of Agencies, Postponment of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,227 (Jan. 29, 
1981). 
 42. See infra text accompanying note 67; Exec. Order No. 12,291, at § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 
13,194, 13,195 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 43. Memorandum on Reducing the Burden of Government Regulation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
166 (Jan. 28, 1992). 
 44. Id. at 167. 
 45. Memorandum on Implementing Regulatory Reforms, 1 PUB. PAPERS 665 (Apr. 29, 
1992). 
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agencies operated under a moratorium on new regulatory actions and were 
theoretically reviewing some of their existing rules.46
The results of this review indicate the importance of periodic review of 
existing regulations.  In response to the President’s memorandum, agencies 
published nineteen final rules which reduced regulatory burdens, either by 
withdrawing previous publications or amending sections of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).
 
47  This result stands in stark contrast to the 
results of the periodic review requirement of the RFA, which achieved a 
smaller number of final rules reducing regulatory burdens over the course 
of almost eight years.48
In 1993, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,866, which 
required agencies to: 
 
submit to OIRA a program . . . under which the agency will periodically 
review its existing regulations to determine whether any such regulations 
should be modified or eliminated so as to make the agency’s regulatory 
program more effective in achieving the regulatory objective, less 
burdensome, or in greater alignment with the President’s priorities and the 
principles set forth in this Executive order.49
The General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a review of the 
agency response to the call for periodic review, and determined that four 
agencies had reviewed a total of 422 rules in the C.F.R.  Of these, 
approximately forty percent constituted actions which would reduce 
regulatory burdens to the regulated public.
 
50  At the same time, agencies 
reported that they had eliminated many duplicative or unnecessary C.F.R. 
sections, totaling more than 13,000 pages.51
In 2001, President George W. Bush imposed a moratorium on federal 
 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. To determine the outcome of President Bush’s general review order, the author 
searched Federal Register notice publications for citations to “Reducing Burden of 
Government Regulation” using Westlaw.  The results are likely to be conservative in their 
attribution of any particular action to the President’s memorandum, as the rule was not 
counted unless it specifically referenced the memorandum. 
 48. See infra Part III.B. 
 49. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,740 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 50. U.S GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES’ EFFORTS TO 
ELIMINATE AND REVISE RULES YIELD MIXED RESULTS 2 (1997), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98003.pdf [herinafter GAO, AGENCIES’ EFFORTS TO 
ELIMINATE]. 
 51. Id. at 7.  However, this amount did not include pages that were added to the C.F.R. 
during the same time-period.  As a result, when GAO reviewed four agencies’ page 
eliminations, it found that their net page elimination was approximately seventeen percent 
of the gross elimination they had reported.  Id. 
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regulation that was very similar to President Reagan’s.52  The Bush 
Administration forbade the publication of pending final rules until they had 
been reviewed by an Administration appointee, and postponed the effective 
date of regulations whose effective date was still pending for sixty days.53  
This moratorium postponed the effective date of some Clinton 
Administration “midnight regulations,” including potentially costly rules 
like the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) information 
privacy rules under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996.54  Most of these regulatory requirements were eventually allowed 
to become final.55
President George W. Bush’s actions in soliciting and acting on public 
nominations for regulatory reform have demonstrated the feasibility and 
advisability of medium-scale periodic reviews.  In 1997, before President 
Bush took office, OMB began submitting reports to Congress on the costs 
and benefits of federal regulation, including a notice that OMB was seeking 
nominations from the regulated public on rules which should be 
reformed.
 
56  Beginning in 2001, however, OMB began earnestly soliciting 
agency input on the suitability of these recommendations for reform, and 
tracking agency changes to the rules.  In 2001 and 2002, OIRA solicited 
general proposals for regulatory reform.57
 
 52. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies; Regulatory Review Plan, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,702 (Jan. 20, 2001), available at 
  In 2004, OIRA focused on 
reform proposals designed to provide regulatory relief to the manufacturing 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/print/20010123-4.html. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462, 82,760-61 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (Health and Human 
Services rule estimated to cost more than $17.5 billion, effective as of February 26, 2001). 
 55. See, e.g., Correction of Effective and Compliance Dates, Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 66 Fed. Reg. 12,434 (Feb. 26, 2001) (codified 
at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (delaying the effective date of the Health and Human Services 
rule); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (Health and Human Services). 
 56. See, e.g., Notice and Request for Comments, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs 
and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,352 (July 22, 1997) (Office of 
Management and Budget); Notice and Request for Comments, Draft Report to Congress on 
the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,034 (Aug. 17, 1998) (Office 
of Management and Budget).  These reports were required by appropriations bills, 
beginning in 1997.  Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 
at § 645, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-366 (1996). 
 57. Notice and Request for Comments, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and 
Benefits of Federal Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,041, 22,054 (May 2, 2001) (Office of 
Management and Budget); Notice and Request for Comments, Draft Report to Congress on 
the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,033 (Mar. 28, 2002) 
(Office of Management and Budget). 
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sector.58
In response to the 2001 public notice, OMB received seventy-one 
nominations, and designated twenty-three of them a “high priority.”
 
59  
Many nominations simply urged agencies to adopt policies or guidance that 
would reduce uncertainty, expressed disapproval of agency actions without 
recommending a course of action, or supported a general withdrawal of a 
rulemaking that had not yet been completed.60  In response to these twenty-
three “high priority” proposals, agencies acted on many and provided 
responses to all of them.61
In 2002, OMB received recommendations for the reform of 316 separate 
rules and guidance documents.
 
62  The overwhelming response to the 2002 
call for nominations for reform forced OMB to change its process for 
identifying those recommendations which should be acted upon.  In 2002, 
OMB forwarded the list of recommendations to the federal agencies 
themselves and to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy at the Small Business 
Administration (SBA), with instructions to identify potential candidates for 
action based on the principles of “efficiency, fairness, and practicality.”63  
Of the more than 300 recommendations, OMB, the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy, and the federal agencies themselves identified thirty-four 
existing rules to be in need of reform.64
OMB’s call for recommendations for reform generally mentioned small 
business, but was not tailored to reducing small entity burdens, as required 
by section 610 of the RFA.
 
65
 
 58. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY REFORM OF THE U.S. MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR (2005), available at 
  Many of the reforms considered did little 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol-
reports_congress.html. 
 59. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 104-06 (2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2002_report_to_congress.pdf [hereinafter OMB, 
STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION] (status of the twenty-three High-Priority Rules OIRA 
Suggested for Reform in 2001). 
 60. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON 
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 65-135 (2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf. 
 61. OMB, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION, supra note 59, at 70. 
 62. Id. at 4. 
 63. John D. Graham, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Memorandum for the President’s 
Management Council: Agency Response to Public Regulatory Reform Nominations (Dec. 
20 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/pmc_agency_response_regreform.html. 
 64. OMB, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION, supra note 59, at 25-28. 
 65. Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 66 Fed. 
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more than eliminate duplicative requirements or “clarify” agency policy 
which impose more regulatory burdens on firms.66
b. Efforts to Review Rules As They Are Promulgated 
  The OMB nomination 
process should not be assumed to be a proper substitute for periodic 
reviews under the RFA.  That said, the OMB nomination process 
demonstrated the feasibility of agency review of existing regulations and 
the ability of OMB to work closely with the agencies to identify and 
complete priority reviews of many of the existing rules that affect small 
entities. 
Currently, most major rules are reviewed outside federal agencies, prior 
to their publication, for their costs and benefits to society.  Agencies have 
proven themselves capable of dealing with the requirement of estimating 
the costs and benefits of their rules and adopting regulatory approaches 
which maximize benefits and minimize costs, while meeting the regulatory 
duties imposed on them by Congress. 
As mentioned above, President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291 
required agencies for the first time to submit rules to OMB for review of 
costs and benefits before publication.67  President Reagan also ordered 
agencies to submit to OMB their annual plans for regulation, to ensure that 
these plans conformed to his Administration’s policies and practices, and to 
assist OMB in identifying opportunities for reducing regulatory burdens.68
In 1993, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,866, which, in 
addition to mandating pre-publication review of regulations similar to 
Executive Order 12,291, ordered federal agencies to conduct periodic 
reviews of their existing regulations to identify rules which had become 
obsolete or whose regulatory objectives could be achieved in a less 
burdensome fashion.
 
69
 
Reg. at 22,054. 
  Less than two years later, President Clinton 
followed up on this Executive Order with a memorandum that ordered 
 66. Of seventy-one nominations received in response to the 2001 solicitation, only 
twenty-three were classified as high-priority actions.  OMB, STIMULATING SMARTER 
REGULATION, supra note 59, at 104-06.  Of the more than 300 nominations for reform 
submitted in response to the 2002 notice, only thirty-four were identified as deserving of 
action.  Id. at 25-28 tbl.9. 
 67. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 at § 3.  Although it is true that 
President Carter’s Executive Order 12,044 was the first measure to explicitly require agency 
heads to consider costs and select the least burdensome of regulatory alternatives, it did not 
provide for review of regulations by non-agency personnel prior to publication of final rules.  
Exec. Order. No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. at 12661-662. 
 68. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 4, 1985). 
 69. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sep. 30, 1993). 
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federal agencies to complete a review of existing regulation in four steps.70  
The President required agencies to identify obsolete, overly burdensome, or 
otherwise unnecessary rules, and to deliver a list of such regulations to 
OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).71  Agencies 
were also ordered to change their enforcement incentives to cease 
rewarding employees for “red tape,” to consult and meet with regulated 
industries and entities, and to identify a list of rulemakings to be conducted 
through negotiated rulemaking.72
c. Ex Post Validation of Cost Estimates 
  Executive Order 12,866 remains in 
effect, and agencies continue to submit regulations to OIRA prior to 
publication for review of costs and benefits. 
One current Bush Administration priority is to implement a policy of ex 
post economic impact review.73  Such reviews would validate ex ante 
agency cost estimates provided to OMB during Executive Order 12,866 
cost-benefit review.  In its draft 2005 report to Congress on regulatory costs 
and benefits, OMB outlined the concept of ex post validation studies in 
depth and solicited comments from the public on the value of such studies 
and their proper scope.74  OMB also presented a review of the literature 
regarding existing ex post validation studies, indicating that a problem 
exists with agency underestimation of economic impacts and 
overestimation of regulatory benefit.75
III. THE HISTORICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 610 OF THE RFA 
 
As discussed above, Congress passed section 610 of the RFA for the 
express purpose of forcing agencies to periodically reexamine their 
regulation of small business, resulting in cost savings.76
 
 70. Memorandum on Regulatory Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 304, 304-06 (Mar. 4, 1995) , 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/search.html (search by title and date). 
  The periodic 
review requirement, however, appears to have failed to result in reduced 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 41-53 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf (providing an 
interesting discussion of the concept). 
 74. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2005 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 35-44 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/draft_2005_cb_report.pdf. 
 75. Id. at 40-44. 
 76. See supra notes 18-19, and accompanying text. 
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regulatory burdens on small businesses.  The record establishes that 
agencies do not complete section 610 reviews for rules that impose 
significant economic impacts on a substantial number of small entities.77  
This failure appears to be due to ambiguities found within the RFA itself 
that allow agencies to defer the consideration of how their actions impact 
small entities.78  Finally, even when ambiguities are resolved in the favor 
of small entities and the agency performs the small entity review required 
by section 610, this review does not usually result in the reduction of 
regulatory burdens on small entities.79
To determine agency compliance with section 610, the author: (1) 
reviewed existing literature on agency compliance with section 610, (2) 
analyzed all final rules promulgated in a year by selected agencies and 
determined the section 610 review rates for those rules, and (3) reviewed 
the regulatory outcomes for every section 610 review notice published in 
the Federal Register for a sample period of seven years.  This research first 
included a review of whether agencies were actually posting notice of 
section 610 reviews, as the RFA requires.  Then, for those rules which were 
subject to section 610 reviews, a determination was made as to whether the 
section 610 reviews actually resulted in regulatory actions that reduced 
regulatory burdens to small business, based on the written records. 
 
The results of the review indicate that the review of final rules under 
section 610 within ten years is not commonplace, and that section 610 
reviews rarely result in the reduction of regulatory burdens to small 
business.  The author’s regulatory survey and review identified a number of 
specific reasons for these problems with agency compliance, as well as 
some shortcomings of section 610 itself with regard to its goal of small 
business burden reduction. 
A. Agencies Do Not Appear to Have Reviewed All Rules the RFA 
Requires 
1. Existing Studies Indicate That Agencies Have Not Reviewed All the 
Rules as Required 
Existing research shows that there is a disparity between the numbers of 
final agency actions referenced in each Unified Agenda and the number of 
section 610 review notices by comparing Unified Agenda entries for 
agencies’ final rules each year with the number of section 610 reviews the 
 
 77. See infra Part III.A. 
 78. See infra Part IV.A. 
 79. See infra Part III.B. 
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agencies completed in the same period.80  In 2005, the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) found that the 2004 Spring and Summer Unified 
Agendas each had an average of about 400 entries with impacts on small 
entities, but only about thirty section 610 notices.81  In another study, GAO 
reviewed entries from the fall of 1988 through the fall of 1997, finding that 
six agencies each had an average of more than thirty entries every year 
which could have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities, and that none of these agencies had section 610 review 
entries in the 1998 Federal Register for the rules they had reported in their 
regulatory plans over the previous ten years.82  In fact, for those half-dozen 
agencies, GAO identified 345 entries in the Fall 1997 edition of the Unified 
Agenda that would have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.83
2. Analysis of Public Filings of Selected Agencies Indicates That 
Agencies Have Not Reviewed All Required Rules 
 
As discussed above, the existing studies generally indicate that the 
number of final rules each year is strikingly greater than the number of 
section 610 reviews,84 but no study to date has actually reviewed whether 
agencies actually completed section 610 reviews when required to do so.  
The reason appears to be that any such study involves an almost inordinate 
amount of time to: (1) identify actual final rules published in a year, (2) 
review the regulatory provisions of each individual rule, and (3) 
“Shepardize” each regulatory provision affecting small entities for at least 
ten years.  Such an approach, however, is necessary.  Existing research is 
helpful and illustrative of the current trend, but agencies can still assert that 
they have been consistently performing section 610 reviews, and that the 
existing research is flawed because: (1) the studies examine the number of 
rulemakings agencies enter into Unified Agenda indexes each year, as 
opposed to the number actually completed;85
 
 80. For example, an agency might have 400 entries in the Spring and Summer Unified 
Agendas listed as final rules, but no entries in those same Unified Agendas for section 610 
reviews. 
 (2) many rules actually 
 81. CURTIS COPELAND, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REEXAMINING RULES: 
SECTION 610 OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT  8 (2005). 
 82. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: AGENCIES’ 
INTERPRETATIONS OF REVIEW REQUIREMENTS VARY 12-14 (1999) [hereinafter GAO, 
AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATIONS], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99055.pdf. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 85. For example, the 2005 CRS study found that Department of Commerce had thirty-
three entries in the June 2004 Unified Agenda that it had identified as likely to have a 
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completed are no longer still in effect after ten years (and therefore are no 
longer subject to section 610); and (3) many rules which are still in effect 
have been so markedly revised that section 610 review would more 
appropriately be done for the rulemakings amending the original rule; in 
effect, “resetting the clock.” 
To determine the validity of the agencies’ rationale, this author 
researched agency practice by reading every final rule promulgated in 1993 
by select agencies and investigated whether each rule was determined to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, thereby triggering the periodic review requirement of section 
610.86  These agencies were selected based on existing research that 
identified them as having the largest numbers of Unified Agenda entries for 
final actions or actions which were likely to impact small entities.87
 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.  COPELAND, supra 
note 
  The 
year 1993 was chosen because any reasonable “grace period” would have 
expired by Summer 2005.  To obtain a representative sample, the author 
reviewed every final rule promulgated in 1993 by Departments of 
Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, as well as the Small 
Business Administration.  The results for 1993 and 1994 are illustrated 
below in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
81, at 8.  Review of Federal Register notices published by the Department of 
Commerce in 1993 shows that the agency published only fourteen final rules through the 
entire year that were characterized as having a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.  See supra Part III.A.2 tbl.1.  Though this sample is small, and any 
discrepancy might be due to statutory changes and the agency’s response to repeated RFA 
litigation between 1993 and 2005, the discrepancy is still present. 
 86. Section 610 does not state whether this impact is measured at the time of publication 
or at the time of periodic review.  See 5 U.S.C. § 610.  This discussion assumes that those 
rules which would impact small business at the time of publication would continue to do so 
at the time of periodic review, while rules which did not have small business impacts at the 
time of publication for the most part have not developed new small business impacts. 
 87. See, e.g., CONSAD RESEARCH CORP., AN EVALUATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT BY FEDERAL AGENCIES 24 (2001), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs215tot.pdf (analyzing the number of final rules issued 
by agencies from 1995 through 1999 and concluding that three agencies (SEC, HHS, and 
Commerce) accounted for half of all final rules and that HHS, Commerce, and EPA 
accounted for half of all final rules that affected small entities—EPA was excluded from this 
analysis due to time constraints). 
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Table 1.  Section 610 Review Rates for All Final Rules Published by 
Selected Agencies (1993) 
 
AGENCY 
FINAL 
RULES 
FINAL RULES AGENCY IDENTIFIED AS 
HAVING SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC 
IMPACT ON SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER 
OF SMALL ENTITIES 
FINAL RULES FOR 
WHICH THE AGENCY 
PUBLISHED NOTICE OF § 
610 REVIEW (TO DATE) 
Commerce 82 14 (17.1%) 0 
Labor 13 0 (0%) 0 
HHS88 197  22 (11.1%) 0 
SBA 17 1 (5.8%) 0 
 
 
 
 
Total 309 37 (11.9%) 0 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, agencies in the sample ranged from zero to 
seventeen percent of their final rules being labeled as likely to have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.  
None of the 37 rules labeled as significant under the RFA promulgated 
during the sample period were analyzed by the agencies under section 
610.89
B. Section 610 Has Not Resulted in a Significant Reduction of 
Regulatory Burdens to Small Entities 
  Some of the possible reasons for this outcome are discussed in Part 
IV. 
Analysis of agency actions in connection with section 610 leads to the 
conclusion that agencies are not reducing burdens to small entities in 
response to section 610 reviews.  For the period reviewed, 1997-2005, the 
author identified notices for 154 separate section 610 reviews, then 
researched each action to determine whether the agency ultimately acted on 
 
 88. HHS published twenty-one final rules in the Federal Register on the same day: 
January 6, 1993.  These notices could properly be considered as one rulemaking, as they 
were accompanied by a single FRFA and addressed the same general regulatory framework 
(food labeling).  However, since they were promulgated separately by the agency and some 
of their provisions separated into separate C.F.R. sections, they were reviewed individually 
for section 610 reviews and continuing effect. 
 89. Clearly, this sample is small, but it does illustrate part of the problem, and invites 
more intensive research into the question.  As discussed below, other agencies have 
published notices of section 610 review for other years.  See infra Part III.B.  For example, 
between the fall of 1997 and the summer of 2005, this author identified 154 section 610 
reviews being referenced in the Unified Agenda. 
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the section 610 review by issuing a final rule.90  Agencies published fifteen 
final rules in response to section 610 reviews that appeared to reduce small 
entity burdens.  Researching the same period, the author found that 
agencies published final rules in twenty-six rulemakings identified as part 
of a section 610 review that appeared to increase regulatory burdens on 
small entities.91  Much more commonly, agencies did not publish final 
rules in response to section 610 review. Ninty-seven actions ultimately did 
not result in a final rule.92
 
 90. This methodology closely matched that employed by GAO in 1997, when it 
reviewed regulatory actions by the Clinton Administration to determine if these actions 
reflected regulatory burden reductions.  GAO reviewed Unified Agenda descriptions of 422 
regulatory actions by four agencies to determine the rule’s effect, proposed and final 
versions  of the rules from the Federal Register, and, if necessary, interviewed agency 
officials.  GAO, AGENCIES’ EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE, supra note 
  Thus, it appears that the possible outcomes from 
a section 610 review conducted during the 1997-2005 sample period were 
(in order of likelihood): (1) no action on the part of the agency, (2) a 
rulemaking which imposed greater regulatory burdens on small entities, 
and (3) a rulemaking which objectively reduced small entity burdens. 
50, at 5-6.  In preparing this 
Article, the author skipped the preliminary step of reviewing Unified Agenda entries due to 
the likelihood of oversimplification by those short discussions and went straight to 
reviewing proposed and final rules.  The author then followed up with interviews of affected 
small entity representatives and agency officials for those rules whose effects were not self-
evident. 
 91. Not surprisingly, there were a few outliers within the sample.  Ten final rules 
appeared to either have no effect on small business due to their being purely technical 
revisions or because they regulated industries which had no small businesses.  In addition, 
although it was not within the author’s expertise to determine whether some rules 
represented burden reductions or increases, questions were resolved in the favor of agencies, 
and three rules were included in the “deregulatory” category that were questionable, and two 
rules were excluded from the “regulatory” category because burden increases were not 
clear.  Further, three rules appeared to both impose and reduce regulatory burdens to small 
business and were excluded from the analysis entirely in the interest of simplicity.  Oddly, 
four rulemakings appeared to be mistakenly identified by the agency in Unified Agenda 
notices as part of section 610 reviews when they actually were not.  In the case of one of 
these rules, the agency both claimed that the rulemaking was part of a section 610 review 
and that the rule was exempt from the RFA—hence the agency included no consideration of 
small business impacts. 
 92. Some agencies published notices in the Federal Register for some reviews stating 
that they had reviewed the rule under section 610 and had determined that no change was 
warranted. 
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TABLE 2.  RESULTS OF SECTION 610 REVIEWS: 1997-2005 
 
Reduce 
Small 
Entity 
Burdens 
Increase 
Small 
Entity 
Burdens 
No Effect on 
Small 
Entities  
Impacts 
Uncertain 
No 
Final 
Agency 
Action 
Listed By 
Error As § 
610 Review 
TOTAL 
15 26 10 2 97 4 154 
10.3% 16.9% 6.5% 1.3% 63% 2.6% 
100.6%
93
 
 
The reasons for this outcome are discussed below in Part IV. 
IV. THE REASONS FOR LOW REVIEW RATES AND THE FAILURE OF 
SECTION 610 TO ACHIEVE REDUCTION IN REGULATORY BURDENS TO 
SMALL ENTITIES 
There are two sets of problems inherent in the current section 610 which 
lead to the outcome of low review rates, and to the Act’s general failure to 
encourage agencies to review existing rules in order to reduce regulatory 
burdens to small entities. 
A. The Causes for Historically Low Review Rates 
Under the current RFA, agencies appear to have three main reasons for 
not completing section 610 reviews for the rules identified by my research.  
Low review rates may stem from agencies: (1) “restarting the clock” by 
amending regulations, (2) making determinations that rules are not actually 
affecting small entities, and (3) in some cases, simply neglecting to fulfill 
their statutory duties. 
1.   Agencies Often “Restart the Clock” for Rules Through Amendment 
One ambiguity within section 610 that appears to lead to low review 
rates is the apparent ability of an agency to “restart the clock” for the ten 
year deadline for periodic review found in the RFA.94  Section 610 
provides for “the review of such rules adopted after the effective date of 
this chapter within ten years of the publication of such rules as the final 
rule.”95
 
 93. Percentages add up to 100.6 percent because they were rounded to the nearest tenth. 
  Section 610 does not discuss whether “rules” refers to only the 
 94. 5 U.S.C § 610(a) (2000). 
 95. Id. 
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changes to the C.F.R. published in the “final rule,” the entire C.F.R. section 
in which those changes are found, or any subsequent amendments.  Further, 
any changes to the amendment may involve RFA determinations of their 
own, which could trigger incremental effects analysis that fails to capture 
the true cost of the regulatory provision, but resets the ten-year review 
cycle.  Hence, many agencies take the view that publication of any 
subsequent amendment to the C.F.R. section altered by the final rule in 
question “restarts the clock,” allowing the agency another ten years for 
RFA review from the date of amendment.96  In fact, some agencies have 
historically taken the view that any review of a C.F.R. section, even 
without amending the first final rule or analyzing the C.F.R. section for the 
elements required by section 610, restarts the clock for purposes of periodic 
review.97
This problem arises commonly in actions that are temporally limited in 
their effects, but which are promulgated under statutory or regulatory 
frameworks that recur or require re-promulgation from time to time.  Some 
examples would include Department of Commerce fisheries quotas and 
other rules that are adjusted from fishing season to fishing season.
 
98  These 
rules are often limited by their fishery regulatory regimes to three to five 
years of applicability, at the end of which the agency can set more or less 
burdensome quotas.99
 
 96. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERVS., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE 
INSTRUCTION 01-111-03: PROCEDURES FOR PERIODIC REVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT RULES UNDER 
SECTION 610 OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT § II (2005) (“Rules Subject to Review”) 
(exempting from section 610 review “multi-year specifications requiring proposed and final 
rulemaking,” which are usually amended and retained for additional years, with existing 
regulatory burdens considered the baseline for regulation), available at 
http://reefshark.nmfs.noaa.gov/f/pds/publicsite/documents/procedures/01-111-03.pdf.  But 
see, EPA, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 33, at 82-83. 
  The agency is usually all but required, however, by 
 97. For instance, in a 1999 report, GAO stated, “SBA’s [Deputy Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy] told us that SBA had reviewed and revised all of its rules in the mid-1990s as 
part of the Clinton Administration’s regulatory reform initiative, and she said that effort met 
the spirit and intent of the section 610 review requirement. . . . Because any rules issued 
after the initiative would have been less than 10 years old in 1998, the [Deputy Chief 
Counsel] said SBA had no rules with a [significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities] that required section 610 review.”  GAO, AGENCIES’ 
INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 82, at 14-15. 
 98. See Magnuson-Stevens Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (Apr. 13, 1976) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000)). 
 99. See, e.g., Proposed Rule and Request for Comments, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; 
Atlantic Surfclam and Ocean Quahog Fishery; Amendment 13 to the Surfclam and Ocean 
Quahog Fishery Management Plan, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,358, 55,361 (Sep. 25, 2003) (Section 
648.71 of this National Marine Fisheries Service amendment sets authority to adjust quotas 
and limits length of time to three years.). 
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fishery reports and the administrative record, to set new rules imposing 
similar quota limits on small entities.100
For example, in a 1993 fisheries rulemaking, the Department of 
Commerce set pollock fishing seasons that prohibited pollock fishing 
between April 2
 
nd and May 31st.101  This season was later amended in 1996 
to restrict fishing from April 16th through August 31st, and from November 
2nd through December 31st.102  The current rule is more permissive, 
containing longer fishing seasons than the 1996 revisions, but it is still 
more restrictive than the 1993 pollock fishing rule.103  If one agrees with 
Commerce’s 1993 conclusion that the original pollock fishery season rule 
could impose significant economic burdens on a substantial number of 
small entities, and that it would trigger section 610 review responsibilities 
on the part of the agency, Commerce would likely claim that the 1993 
rulemaking was superseded by the 1996 amendment and subsequent 
actions.  Not surprisingly, all fourteen of the final rules published by the 
Department of Commerce in 1993 were fisheries regulations, and none of 
these rules appear to have been reviewed under section 610 of the RFA.104  
Many of these rules, however, set baselines for regulatory compliance for 
subsequent rules, and small entities are still required to comply with 
them.105
2. Agencies Do Not Appear to Review All Rules Which Have a 
Significant Economic Impact on a Substantial Number of Small Entities 
 
Section 610 only requires agencies to periodically review those rules that 
“have or will have a significant economic impact upon a substantial 
number of small entities.”106  Agencies interpret this section differently.  
Some, like EPA, do not review a rule at all unless, at the time of its final 
publication, the agency had determined that it would have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.107
 
 100. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1851 (national standards requiring plans to be set to achieve 
optimum fish yield and be based on the best scientific information available), 1852(h)(5) 
(requiring fishery management councils to continuously review fish yields), 1853(a) 
(requiring fishery management plans to take fish status information into account). 
  Others, such 
as Department of Transportation, take a fresh look at the old rule and make 
 101. 58 Fed. Reg. 16,786, 16,787 (Mar. 31, 1993). 
 102. 61 Fed. Reg. 39601, 39,602 (July 30, 1996). 
 103. 50 C.F.R. § 679.23(d)(2) (2005). 
 104. See supra tbl.1 
 105. 16 U.S.C. § 1857. 
 106. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a). 
 107. EPA, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 35, at 82 (“Only rules that were 
subject to the RFA and were not certified, are subject to § 610 review.”). 
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a threshold determination as to whether the rule currently has a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.108
a. Agencies Often Originally Certify Rules That Should Not Be Certified 
 
As illustrated above, agencies promulgate a large number of rules that 
the agencies certified under the RFA, at the time of their publication, as not 
likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.109  This fact is important because some agencies instruct 
personnel conducting section 610 reviews that if a rule was certified at the 
time of its publication, then it should not be considered for section 610 
review.110  This practice leads to rules being excluded from section 610 
review which may have actually had a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities at the time of their 
publication.  Historically, agencies often denied that their rules harm small 
entities, even despite contrary evidence.111  The trigger for an agency’s 
section 610 duty to periodically review a rule is whether or not the agency 
has determined the rule would have a “significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.”112
Under the RFA, agencies make a threshold determination of the 
potential impacts of a rule on small entities.
  Unfortunately, ambiguity found 
within the RFA itself has allowed agencies to avoid reviewing rules which 
arguably harm small entities by routinely certifying rules without adequate 
factual basis, and by ignoring the current harmful effects of a rule in favor 
of agency determinations made before the rule was promulgated. 
113  If the agency determines 
that the rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, then the agency may certify the rule as such, and 
avoid the regulatory flexibility analyses required by the RFA.114
 
 108. GAO, AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 
  Upon 
such a determination, however, the agency must provide the certification to 
82, at 11-12 (“[O]fficials said DOT 
must review all of its rules within 10 years of their issuance to determine whether they have 
a SEISNSE [significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities] at the 
time of the review.”). 
 109. See supra Part III.A.2 tbl.1. 
 110. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERVS., supra note 96, § II (noting that only 
rules published with FRFAs are subject to section 610 review). 
 111. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: KEY TERMS 
STILL NEED TO BE CLARIFIED 3-6 (2001), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01669t.pdf (GAO analysis of an EPA decision to certify a 
single rule, as well as a discussion of agency-wide certification practice). 
 112. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000). 
 113. 5 U.S.C. § 605(b) (2000). 
 114. § 605(b). 
SEE_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:25 PM 
2006] FEDERAL AGENCIES’ FAILURE  125 
the public in the Federal Register at the same time as the proposed or final 
rule, along with the factual bases the agency relied on in making the 
determination.115  When an agency thus certifies a rule, it is not required to 
conduct a review of the rule’s impact to small entities at a later date.116  
This statutory scheme avoids requiring agencies to spend taxpayer 
resources and valuable agency time reviewing rules for which such analysis 
is not likely to benefit small entities.  Agencies, however, regularly certify 
rules under the RFA as not having a significant economic impact to a 
substantial number of small entities despite indications in favor of a 
contrary finding.117
The problem stems from the lack of definitions in the RFA for the terms 
“significant economic impact” and “substantial number.”  Some agencies 
routinely certify rules by adopting standards for these terms which result in 
every rule being certified.
 
118
 
 115. § 605(b). 
  The rationale behind such action is twofold.  
 116. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2000). 
 117. For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service promulgates many rules designating 
large land areas as critical habitat for endangered species.  Although the SBA’s Office of 
Advocacy regularly comments on the impacts of these rules, and has informed the FWS on a 
number of occasions that rules were not properly certified, the FWS has never completed a 
regulatory flexibility analysis and continues to certify every designation of land as critical 
habitat as not having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.  See, e.g., Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. 
Small Bus. Admin., to Craig Manson, Assistant Sec’y for Fish, Wildlife & Parks, U.S. Dep’t 
of Interior (July 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/fws05_0714.pdf (recommending withdrawal of 
designation of critical habitat for the Southwestern willow flycatcher and republication with 
regulatory flexibility analysis); Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., to Craig Manson, Assistant Sec’y for Fish, Wildlife & 
Parks, U.S. Dep’t of Interior (Mar. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/fws05_0329.pdf (recommending publication with 
regulatory flexibility analysis for designation of critical habitat for the Southwestern willow 
flycatcher); Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. 
Admin., to Steven Spangle, Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (June 27, 2003), 
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/fws03_0627.pdf (recommending 
publication of regulatory flexibility analysis for designation of critical habitat for the pygmy 
owl). 
 118. One ongoing example of this practice is again found in the experience of the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, which routinely tailors its economic analysis to result in a 
conclusion that the rule analyzed will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities—even in the face of conflicting precedent.  See, e.g., 
N.C. Fisheries Ass’n v. Daley, 27 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660-61 (E.D. Va.) (stating that RFA 
certification amounted to “willful blindness” because the agency measured economic 
impacts as a percentage of income to all fishermen, rather than only those regulated); 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Establishment of Three Additional 
Manatee Protection Areas in Florida, 68 Fed. Reg. 16,602, 16,617 (Apr. 4, 2003) (codified 
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (adopting test for “significant economic impact” that divides the total 
small business economic impact into the total personal income for every industry in the 
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First, the agency avoids being required to conduct regulatory flexibility 
analyses which consume agency resources and could support a regulatory 
alternative other than that which the agency favors.  Second, agencies avoid 
any requirement to ever review their rules, and can conserve agency 
resources later on. 
In 1992, the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA surveyed federal 
agencies to determine agency compliance with section 610 of the RFA.119  
Forty-four percent of federal agencies claimed that they had never 
promulgated rules which would have had a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities, and hence, were not required to 
conduct reviews under section 610.120  In 2001, CONSAD Research 
Corporation released a report indicating that agency compliance with the 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) and FRFA requirements 
went up in the years between 1995 and 1999.121  A representative sample 
of agency regulators certified a smaller percentage of their rules in 1999 
than they did in 1995.122  In 1995, agencies completed a FRFA for eighteen 
percent of the final rules sampled, whereas in 1999, agencies completed 
FRFAs in forty-nine percent of the rules.123  At the same time, Congress 
amended the RFA in 1996 to require agencies to provide the factual bases 
for their certification statements and to provide the right of judicial review 
to regulated small entities regarding those certification decisions.124
b. Some Rules That Were Originally Certified Currently Have 
Significant Economic Impacts on Substantial Numbers of Small Entities 
 
The second reason for the disproportionate number of section 610 
reviews is that agencies often claim that an original rule turned out not to 
have a significant economic impact on small entities.  Agencies are 
 
affected area, predictably finding that, though a rule might force every small business in a 
specific industry in the area into insolvency, the resulting impacts are “insignificant” with 
respect to the total gross product of the area); see also Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., to David Hankla, Field Supervisor, 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (June 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/fws03_0603.pdf (informing FWS that a proposed 
rule had employed an improper test under the RFA to conclude in a finding that there was 
no significant economic impact). 
 119. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: STATUS OF 
AGENCIES’ COMPLIANCE 13 (1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151400.pdf. 
 120. See id. at 14-15. 
 121. CONSAD RESEARCH CORP., supra note 87, at 1. 
 122. Id. at 18. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 
857 (1996). 
SEE_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:25 PM 
2006] FEDERAL AGENCIES’ FAILURE  127 
required by the RFA to implement plans for periodic regulatory review,125  
but some, like the EPA, have adopted plans for review which require 
agency officials to review only those rules which were not certified at the 
time of their publication.126  Other agencies, like the Department of 
Transportation, claim to review their rules at the time of the periodic 
reviews in an initial screening analysis to determine if the rule currently 
has a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.127
3. Agencies May Simply Neglect (or be Unable) to Fulfill Their Statutory 
Duties 
  Given the very low level of section 610 reviews, it is likely that 
some rules are mischaracterized by agency officials during the section 610 
review “screening” as not significant or affecting an insubstantial number 
of small entities. 
Third, some rules may have been neglected due to a lack of institutional 
memory at agencies, an unfamiliarity with the RFA, or an absence of staff 
necessary to complete section 610 reviews.  Since it is impossible to 
provide evidence to prove such assumptions, it would appear proper to 
assume that this would account for very few section 610 review failures.  
Since, however, even the agency that deals with small business issues on a 
daily basis appeared astoundingly unfamiliar with the RFA in the early 
1990s,128
B. The Causes for the Failure of Section 610 to Achieve Regulatory 
Burden Reduction for Small Entities 
 it is not unreasonable to believe that at least a handful of rules 
were not reviewed as a result of some institutional shortcoming or 
oversight. 
Even when agencies correctly identify rules which harm small business 
and agree to review them, these reviews are often not sufficiently detailed 
to produce the benefits the RFA envisioned.  In other instances, reviews 
have the exact opposite effect of that intended by the RFA, where the 
agency labels a regulatory action a section 610 review, even though the 
 
 125. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2000). 
 126. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 128. The SBA published one rule in 1993 which the agency identified as likely to have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.  For this rule, the 
agency misidentified its regulatory flexibility analysis as a “regulatory eligibility [sic] 
analysis” and appears to have simply copied its “initial regulatory eligibility [sic] analysis,” 
typo included, into its final rule.  SBA Small Business Size Standards; Business Loan 
Program; Alternative Size Standard, 58 Fed. Reg. 12,334, 12,334  (Mar. 4, 1993). 
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purpose of the rulemaking is to impose further burdens on small entities. 
1. Agencies Are Not Required to Act in Response to Section 610 Reviews 
Section 610 requires agencies to conduct a “review” of rules ten years 
after their final publication.  Agencies are instructed to the following effect: 
Each year, each agency shall publish in the Federal Register a list of the 
rules which have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities, which are to be reviewed pursuant to this section 
during the succeeding twelve months. The list shall include a brief 
description of each rule and the need for and legal basis of such rule and 
shall invite public comment upon the rule.129
Thus, section 610 does not require the agency to re-promulgate rules, nor 
does it require the agency to even publish the results of its “review.”  In 
fact, in almost all cases, the only indicator to the public that a rule was 
actually reviewed is the notice published in the Unified Agenda.
 
130  It is 
unsurprising, then, that the vast majority of section 610 reviews conclude 
with no agency action—and hence, no small entity regulatory relief.131
2. Agencies Are Not Required to Provide Meaningful Opportunity for 
Public Involvement During Section 610 Review 
 
The law as currently constituted does not appear to provide a meaningful 
opportunity for public involvement in the section 610 review process.  
 
 129. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000). 
 130. The notable exception to the rule is the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, which publishes lengthy reports on the results of its completed section 610 
reviews on its website.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 
Lookback Reviews (2005), 
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance_assistance/lookback.html.  While these reports 
invariably conclude that the rule could not be adjusted to reduce burdens on small entities, 
and do not acknowledge that the rules impose costs on the regulated public, they are 
informative and go into great detail on the benefits of the regulation.  See, e.g., Regulatory 
Review of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Ethylene Oxide Standard, 
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1047 (2005), available at 
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance_assistance/lookback/ethylene_oxide_lookback.pdf. 
 131. Even starker, the majority of actions agencies actually do identify as being taken in 
response to a section 610 review should probably not be classified as such.  As section III 
outlines, it appears far more likely that an agency action that is claimed to be in response to 
a section 610 review will increase small entity burdens, rather than decrease them.  See 
supra Part III.B.  This leads to the conclusion that at least some of these rules were not 
actually promulgated in the course of an agency effort to reduce existing small entity 
burdens.  Hence, agencies appear to be truly acting to reduce small entity burdens in 
response to a very small percentage of completed section 610 reviews (approximately ten 
percent).  See supra tbl.2. 
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Section 610 does not require agencies to provide the public with notice that 
a review is currently underway, nor is the agency required to alert the 
public as to when the review will be completed.  Agencies must only 
annually “publish in the Federal Register a list of the rules which have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, 
which are to be reviewed pursuant to this section during the succeeding 
twelve months.”132
As a result, most agencies do not publish notices in the Federal Register 
informing the public that rule review is currently underway, apart from a 
notice that the rule may be reviewed sometime within the next twelve 
months, nor do the agencies actively solicit comments on issues being 
reviewed.
 
133  Section 610 reviews carry forward from one Unified Agenda 
to the next, with some agencies putting off section 610 reviews time and 
again.134
 
 132. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000). 
  In addition, because the section 610 review notices are only 
published in the Federal Register, they may go unnoticed by large numbers 
of potentially affected small entities. 
 133. Some agencies occasionally publish notices in the Federal Register alerting the 
public to an open 610 review, but this is not common practice, and even when agencies 
publish notices, they do not do so consistently.  See, e.g., OSHA Notice of a Regulatory 
Flexibility Act Review of Lead in Construction, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,739 (June 6, 2005) (to be 
codified at C.F.R. pt. 1926).  Such notices must also be balanced against agencies that take a 
different approach to soliciting public participation, declining to include their notices in the 
Unified Agenda to make sure the notices are reflected in the index to section 610 reviews, 
and instead occasionally publishing all their section 610 review notices as a long list of 
C.F.R. sections that might be reviewed sometime in the future.  The FCC Possible Revision 
or Elimination of Rules, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,416 (June 8, 2005), provides a pertinent example.  
It provides a massive list of C.F.R. sections which reached their respective ten-year 
anniversaries sometime between 2002 and 2005, with no discussion of the extent each 
section had a continuing need, and no discussion of the agency’s thoughts on changed 
circumstances.  Further, there was no mention of any complaints received about each 
section, apart from a statement of purpose that appears copied and pasted from each original 
rule. 
 134. One notable example is OSHA, which twice published section 610 review notices 
for two separate rules in every Unified Agenda for four years.  See, e.g., Seminannual 
Agenda of Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 23,014, 23,081 (Apr. 24, 2000) (OSHA “Control of 
Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout) (Completion of a Section 610 Review)”); 
Semiannual Agenda of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 62,748, 62,778 (Nov. 29, 1996) (OSHA 
“Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout) (Section 610 Review)”).  While 
such extended dedication to considering small entity impacts is surely commendable, it is 
likely that the extended nature of these notices reduced their value to the public in alerting 
regulated entities that the agency was actually in the process of reviewing the rule. 
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3. Agencies Often Label Regulatory Action as Rulemaking in Response 
to Section 610 Review to Satisfy the Letter of the Law, Though the 
Rulemaking is Intended to Impose New Burdens on Small Entities 
The weakness of the actual requirements of section 610 becomes 
apparent when one surveys the results of section 610 reviews.  As 
discussed above, agencies report that they have conducted a large number 
of reviews over the past twenty-five years, but regulatory actions in 
response to these reviews are few and far between.135
A prime example of such improper labeling is the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) 2003 final rule, Transportation of 
Household Goods.
  When agencies do 
propose an action that is identified as a response to a section 610 review, 
however, most often it will actually increase the regulatory burden on 
small business. 
136  In this rulemaking, the agency did not explain how 
the rule incorporated the non-public section 610 review that the agency 
claimed the rule was in response to.  In fact, the rule introduced new 
requirements that, among other things, increased the paperwork burden for 
each small entity by five hundred hours, approximately a sixty percent 
increase, even though it was certified as not having a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.137  FMCSA did not 
discuss what regulatory alternatives were available to reduce the new rule’s 
impacts on small entities or why the agency did not adopt those 
alternatives.  The rulemaking record did not support the conclusion that the 
agency was acting to reduce the existing regulation’s impact on small 
entities, nor that the agency had previously completed a periodic review 
with the goal of reducing burdens to small entities.  It is difficult to 
conclude that the agency was acting on the results of a completed section 
610 review, rather than simply imposing new regulatory obligations under 
the auspices of a section 610 review that should have been completed prior 
to the rulemaking.138
 
 135. See supra Part III.B. 
 
 136. FMCSA Transportation of Household Goods; Consumer Protection Regulations, 68 
Fed. Reg. 35,064 (June 11, 2003) (codified at C.F.R. pts. 375 & 377). 
 137. Id. at 35,088. 
 138. It seems almost unfair to single FMCSA out for promulgating such rules “in 
response to a section 610 review.”  Other agencies also often claim that large or 
disproportionately costly rules are actually the result of a section 610 review.  See, e.g., 
Veterinary Diagnostic Services User Fees, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,305 (May 6, 2004) (after issuing 
a rule that increased inspection fees to small entities, agency responded to a comment from 
an export inspector who claimed that the rule would make his operation unprofitable by 
telling him if the increase put him out of business, another exporter would be able to take 
over for him); FCC Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
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V. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO REFORM SECTION 610 
A. The House and Senate Bills 
There are currently two bills pending in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate which are designed in part to address the ongoing issues 
with section 610 review.  As discussed above, Congress has attempted in 
the past to address the serious problems with implementation of section 610 
of the RFA.139
The Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act
 
140 was introduced in the 
House of Representatives by Small Business Committee Chairman Donald 
Manzullo (Ill.-16) on February 9, 2005.  The Senate Small Business 
Committee Chairwoman, Senator Olympia Snowe (ME), introduced the 
Regulatory Flexibility Reform Act of 2005 on July 13, 2005.141
House Bill 682 would provide for a new regulatory authority for the 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA to issue regulations that interpret 
the provisions of the RFA, including section 610.
  The bills 
amend section 610 in an almost identical fashion. 
142  This regulatory 
authority could be exercised to adopt some of the recommendations made 
below regarding how the RFA should be interpreted.  For example, some 
clear authority could be provided on the subject of whether amending 
existing rules “restarts the clock” for purposes of section 610 review.143
 
Protection Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144 (July 25, 2003) (rule introduced wide-ranging 
new prohibitions on small entities soliciting business by phone and fax that imposed major 
costs, including new “do not call” lists businesses would be required to purchase, blanket 
prohibitions on faxes, record keeping requirements, and other provisions); Government 
Contractors: Affirmative Action Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,022 (Nov. 13, 2000) (after 
issuing final rule imposing new reporting requirement for all small business government 
contractors estimated to impose more than 1,000,000 hours of annual paperwork burden, 
agency certified rule as not having significant economic impact on substantial number of 
small entities and dismissed comments challenging agency’s characterization of existing 
burdens). 
  
For some of these recommendations, the existing statute does not make 
clear that they could be adopted properly through regulation.  Therefore, 
this paper not only highlights the potential application of House Bill 682’s 
regulatory authority provision, but because the legislation is pending and 
Congress currently has an opportunity to directly address the ongoing 
problems with section 610, the majority of these recommendations focus on 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23, 124. 
 140. Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act, H.R. 682, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 141. Regulatory Flexibility Reform Act of 2005, S. 1388, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 142. See H.R. 682 § 10 (amending Chapter 6 of Title 5 to add 5 U.S.C. § 613). 
 143. See id. 
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direct action by Congress. 
B. The Potential Effects of Pending Legislation on Low Review Rates 
The pending legislation would appear to resolve the agency certification 
issue and make strides towards reducing agency neglect of section 610 
responsibilities.  Neither Act, however, appears to directly solve the issue 
of when the timeframe for review begins running, or whether it is tolled by 
amendments to final rules, or otherwise affected by subsequent agency 
actions. 
1. Pending Legislation Does Not Directly Address the Problem of 
“Restarting the Clock” 
Neither bill directly addresses the issue of what a “rule” is for the 
purposes of section 610 review.  Both retain the language of the current 
section 610, for which the term “rule” would continue to be defined in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 as an agency action required to be promulgated through 
notice and comment rulemaking.144  House Bill 682 would appear to grant 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy the authority to further define “rule” for 
purposes of section 610.145
2. Pending Legislation Would Answer the Question as to When Agencies 
Should Determine If a Rule Has a Significant Economic Impact on a 
Substantial Number of Small Entities 
 
Both House Bill 682 and Senate Bill 1388 would address the open 
question as to whether a rule must be reviewed under section 610 if it was 
originally published with a certification.  House Bill 682 and Senate Bill 
1388 provide that an agency must review any rule that “the head of the 
agency determines has a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities” and further state that “[s]uch determination shall 
be made without regard to whether the agency performed an analysis under 
section 604.”146
Thus, the bills would require all agencies to review all rules to determine 
whether the rule was currently having a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. 
 
 
 144. See S. 1388 § 5; H.R. 682 § 7.  H.R. 682, however, would expand the definition of 
“rule” to include a number of specialized agency actions not currently considered by those 
agencies to be “rules.”  See H.R. 682 § 3. 
 145. See H.R. 682 § 10 (“[T]he Chief Counsel for Advocacy shall . . . issue rules 
governing agency compliance with this chapter.”). 
 146. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(a)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same). 
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3. Pending Legislation Addresses Agency Neglect by Requiring 
Publication of Agency Plans to Conduct Section 610 Reviews 
The pending legislation sets a definite timetable for the rectification of 
agency neglect of section 610 reviews.  Under both bills, agencies would 
be required to publish a plan for review of all existing regulations within 
the next ten years.147  In addition, they both contain provisions which 
would require every agency to “annually submit a report regarding the 
results of its review . . . to Congress and, in the case of agencies other than 
independent regulatory agencies . . . to the Administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and 
Budget.”148
Both bills, however, would alter the current requirement that agencies 
publish a list of rules “to be reviewed pursuant to this section during the 
succeeding twelve months,”
  Assuming that Congress and OIRA followed up with at least 
minimal oversight of the reports, this reporting provision can be anticipated 
to persuade agencies to devote more attention to the need for section 610 
reviews and to greatly reduce inadvertent non-compliance.  In addition, the 
oversight would encourage agencies to devote agency resources to 
reviewing rules, thus reducing the number of agencies that engage in pro 
forma exercises labeled as section 610 reviews. 
149 and replace it with language which does not 
set a time restraint on the agency.150  While this notice requirement could 
be read to require agencies to publish notice at the same time as their 
section 610 review, it is unclear if this will occur, as current OIRA and 
Regulatory Information Service Center guidance instructs agencies to 
submit their section 610 review notices to the Unified Agenda twice per 
year. 151
C. The Potential Shortcomings of Pending Legislation on the Overall 
Failure of Section 610 to Result in Any Reduction of Unnecessary 
Regulatory Burdens 
 
Although the legislative changes proposed would be a helpful first step, 
they would likely actually do little to encourage agency action to reduce 
small entity burdens beyond that incorporated in the current, ineffective 
 
 147. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(b)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same). 
 148. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(c)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same). 
 149. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000). 
 150. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(c)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same). 
 151.  See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs to the 
Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies and Managing and Exec. Dirs. of 
Certain Agencies and Comm’ns, Attachment 1 (June 10, 1997) (offering guidelines for 
agencies with respect to the creation of an index for section 610 reviews) (on file with 
author). 
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version of section 610.  No provisions of the House and Senate bills require 
agencies to act— or even to provide the public with the contents of final 
decisions to not act—under section 610.  While the web page publication 
requirement may increase small entity exposure to section 610 reforms, the 
lack of a requirement tying notice to an actual, ongoing review reduces the 
notice’s value in facilitating a forum for meaningful public comment.  The 
legislation introduces no new requirements limiting agency designation of 
regulatory acts as in response to a completed section 610 review. 
1. Pending Legislation Does Not Require Agencies to Take Any Action in 
Response to Completed Reviews 
The pending legislation would not require agencies to act in response to 
their section 610 reviews.152  While both would require new reports to 
Congress and OIRA on the results of these reviews, neither requires 
agencies to publish a regulatory proposal based on the results of the review 
or any notice to the public upon the completion of the review.  Since the 
bills would make no change as to post-review publication requirements, the 
current practice of filing notice of intent to review a rule would continue to 
suffice for purposes of section 610 compliance.153
2. Pending Legislation Does Not Add a Meaningful Opportunity for 
Public Involvement in Section 610 Reviews 
 
The legislation would not require agencies to allow the public to 
comment with a notice that the review was currently underway.  As with 
the current section 610, the bills would only require the publication of 
notice that a rule would be subject to review at some point.154
The bills, however, take a very positive step in the direction of providing 
the public with information on ongoing reviews.  House Bill 682 and 
Senate Bill 1388 would both require agencies to post their notices online, 
  
Furthermore, there is no provision to prevent agencies from carrying over 
notices from year to year (other than the ten-year review deadline itself), 
and the message of the need for small entities to become involved could be 
diluted. 
 
 152. Both bills retain the simple requirement to file notice of intent to review a rule with 
no subsequent post-review publication requirements, though both require a new report to 
Congress and/or the OIRA on the results of reviews.  See S. 1388 § 5; H.R. 682 § 7. 
 153. See 5 U.S.C.§ 610(c) (2000); see also S. 1388 § 5; H.R. 682 § 7. 
 154. See S. 1388 § 5 (adding 5 U.S.C. § 610(e): “The agency shall publish in the Federal 
Register and on its Web site a list of rules to be reviewed pursuant to such plan.”); H.R. 682 
§ 7 (same). 
SEE_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:25 PM 
2006] FEDERAL AGENCIES’ FAILURE  135 
thus affording the public more reasonable notice.155
3. Pending Legislation Does Not Address the Agency Use of Regulatory 
Actions to Satisfy the Review Requirement 
  Depending on the 
popularity and usability of agency web sites, this provision should increase 
the visibility of section 610 reviews. 
It is unclear whether the proposed legislation would do much to deter 
agencies from labeling regulatory actions as satisfying section 610 review 
requirements or arising from section 610 reviews.  As discussed above, the 
legislation would introduce no new requirement for agency action in 
response to completed internal reviews.156  Section 610 currently already 
states that the “purpose of the review shall be to determine whether rules 
should be continued without change, or should be amended or 
rescinded . . . to minimize any significant economic impacts of the rules on 
a substantial number of small entities.”157  The House and Senate bills 
retain this language, with the House bill adding a second purpose, to 
“maximize any significant beneficial economic impacts.”158
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS THE 
IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN THIS ARTICLE 
 
The currently pending legislation addresses some of the problems 
underlying the general low rates of agency review under section 610.  This 
Article makes additional recommendations based on the results of its 
review of agency practices and the general failure of the current section 
610 to result in any significant benefit to small entities. 
A. Recommendation to Address Low Review Rates: Legislation 
Should Directly Address the Question of How Subsequent Amendment 
of a Rule Affects the Ten-Year Periodic Review Timetable 
Regardless of the method chosen to address the problem of no 
reductions of regulatory burdens, legislation should solve the problem of 
low review rates by including a clause explicitly stating when the tolling of 
the ten-year period begins, and what rulemakings are to be included within 
the review.  This Article also recommends tailoring the remedies available 
for agency noncompliance to ensure that agencies conduct the reviews 
 
 155. See S. 1388 § 5; H.R. 682 § 7. 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 152-153. 
 157. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2000). 
 158. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. §610(a)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same). 
SEE_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:25 PM 
136 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  [Vol. XXXIII 
required of them. 
1. Legislation Should Further Clarify When the Ten-Year Period Begins 
and Ends 
The following sentence originates from the legislation’s proposed 
section 610(b), with additional text by the author in brackets and italics: 
(b)  The plan shall provide for the review of all such agency rules existing 
on the date of the enactment of the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements 
Act within 10 years of the date of publication of the plan in the Federal 
Register and for review of rules adopted after the date of enactment of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act within 10 years after the 
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register.159
Such a provision would allow for efficient review of all the regulation as 
it currently exists, make clear the timetable for the review, and establish a 
baseline date for estimating future reviews of the code sections. 
  [Should 
subsequent amendment of the rule impose a significant economic burden 
on a substantial number of small entities, the later action shall be 
reviewed in conjunction with the original final rule ten years after the 
promulgation of the original final rule and every ten years thereafter.] 
Since the problem of “restarting the clock” stems from agencies’ 
interpretations of the language in section 610, House Bill 682’s grant of 
regulatory authority could also indirectly address the issue.  Upon passage 
of the current version of House Bill 682, the Chief Counsel for Advocacy 
could clarify the effect of subsequent amendment of a final rule on the way 
agencies are to calculate the ten year period referred to in the statute, using 
language similar to that proposed here for inclusion in pending legislation.  
Such implementing regulation would not establish new duties for agencies 
not found in the statute itself, so it would appear equally appropriate to 
address the issue either through express statutory language or through the 
grant of regulatory authority to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy.  Since the 
opportunity is present for Congress to address the issue directly, however, 
this Article recommends that Congress itself act to resolve ambiguity. 
2. Legislation Should Improve Available Remedies to Ensure Agencies 
Conduct Required Reviews 
What penalty should be imposed for agency refusal to implement section 
610?  Agencies’ compliance patterns demonstrate that they are willing to 
routinely ignore the RFA’s section 610 requirement, although it is 
 
 159. See H.R. 682 § 7 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(b)). 
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judicially reviewable.160
Currently, it is not clear whether small entities or their trade associations 
would challenge agency failure to comply with section 610 if notice and 
comment rulemaking were required.  It is instructive to recall that today, 
small entities and trade associations are permitted to petition for 
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act,
  Small entities and their trade associations are 
currently not willing to devote hundreds of thousands of dollars to forcing 
pro forma section 610 review notices to be published in the Unified 
Agenda, but would they enforce their rights if a challenge could force the 
agencies to provide meaningful public participation through notice and 
comment rulemaking? 
161
This Article concludes, however, that the agency section 610 compliance 
patterns demonstrate a widespread and continuing problem.  Forcing small 
entities to seek a court order to force review is unlikely to provide 
sufficient incentive to regulated entities, as agencies currently face just 
such a remedy,
 yet they do not do 
so.  The current remedy for a section 610 violation—a judicial order to an 
agency to publish a notice in the Unified Agenda that, at some point in the 
next twelve months, the agency will complete an internal review—could 
not possibly justify the expense of retaining counsel, filing an action, and 
following up with the agency to ensure that the agency complied with a 
court order.  Once the remedy becomes a reopening of the rulemaking and 
public participation, it may be that more trade associations are willing to 
expend funds to challenge onerous regulatory requirements. 
162
Thus, the remedy section of the RFA should specify that a vacation of 
the underlying rule is the sole remedy for violation of section 610, with no 
judicial discretion to allow the agency to continue enforcing the rule 
pending an allegedly forthcoming section 610 review.  To this end, as 
discussed below, I recommend the addition of a new subsection (f) of 
section 610 which reads as follows: 
 but have ignored their responsibilities.  The main remedy 
for complete failure to complete a periodic review under section 610 should 
not be a court order to complete section 610 review.  Rather, agencies 
should be put on notice that failure to review rules under section 610 will 
be fatal to the underlying rule itself. 
 
 160. See 5 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2000) (“For any rule subject to this chapter, a small entity 
that is adversely affected or aggrieved by final agency action is entitled to judicial review of 
agency compliance with the requirements of [section] 610 . . . .”). 
 161. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2000). 
 162. 5 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2000) (providing for review of agency failure to comply with 
section 610 and setting basic remedy as remand of rule with deferred enforcement against 
small entities). 
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(f)  Rules for which the agency has not published a general notice of 
proposed rulemaking upon the expiration of ten years or final rule upon 
the expiration of eleven years from the date of their initial publication in 
the Federal Register shall lapse and become unenforceable.  Provided, an 
agency may continue enforcement of a lapsed rule once for a period of not 
more than twelve months from the publication of a determination in the 
Federal Register stating that the lapse of the rule would have a significant 
negative impact to human health or safety, along with the factual basis for 
such determination.163
The purpose of this subsection would be to “sunset” those rules for 
which the agency ignored its responsibility to conduct periodic review, and 
the language would ensure compliance with the notice and comment 
requirement suggested below.  The provision would allow an agency to 
publish its notice of proposed rulemaking sometime before the expiration 
of ten years, but to delay publication of the final rule for up to one year 
after the statutory ten-year review period, allowing for more than adequate 
time for timely and sufficient consideration of the record.  Also, for those 
significant rules that the agency has overlooked and inadvertently allowed 
to lapse, the agency may keep them in effect, provided the agency can 
show that the absence of the rule would have a significant negative impact 
on human health or safety. 
 
While sunsetting a rule for which an agency has refused to conduct 
periodic review may seem an overly harsh penalty, analysis of the record 
shows that traditional judicial remedies have proven almost completely 
ineffective at ensuring that agencies conduct such reviews.  Legal 
challenges to agencies’ failures to comply may increase in number once 
judicial remedies become more likely to encourage public participation, but 
given that agencies have had a quarter of a century to bring themselves into 
compliance, it is unlikely that agencies will adopt better compliance 
regimes without more substantive penalties.  Further, for those rules which 
temporarily lapse and during that time could have serious implications, the 
new language would provide a mechanism for an agency to immediately 
reinstitute the effectiveness of the rule, pending forthcoming periodic 
review. 
 
 163. See infra Part VI.B.1. 
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B. Recommendation to Address Section 610’s Overall Failure to 
Reduce Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens: Legislation Should 
Introduce a Requirement for Agencies to Conduct Some Public 
Process in Response to a Completed Section 610 Review 
As illustrated above, the most likely current outcome of a section 610 
review conducted internally within an agency is no action.164  It is clear 
that federal agencies are unlikely to reduce regulatory burdens on small 
entities following section 610 reviews.  For section 610 to be a truly 
effective periodic review requirement, however, it must contain a provision 
which requires agencies to open their process to the public in some fashion 
and come to a final public and judicially-reviewable decision.  This Article 
identifies four such options: (1) notice and comment rulemaking every ten 
years, (2) notice and comment rulemaking in response to a petition from 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, (3) small entity review panels similar to 
those currently conducted in EPA and OSHA rulemakings, and (4) a 
combination of section 610 reviews and Paperwork Reduction Act reviews, 
and oversight by OMB and the SBA’s Office of Advocacy.165
Since all of these options would introduce new duties on agencies not 
currently found in section 610, it appears that the adoption of any of them 
would require legislation, as opposed to relying on House Bill 682’s grant 
of regulatory authority to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy. 
  The Article 
concludes that the adoption of option (1), requiring notice and comment 
rulemaking for periodic reviews, would be the most effective and efficient 
option available, but leaves open the possibility of combining this 
rulemaking process with small entity review panels discussed in option (3). 
1. Mandatory Notice and Comment Rulemaking Every Ten Years 
One option to ensure agency action is to require the agency to reopen 
every rulemaking to notice and comment every ten years, with the stated 
goal of minimizing the significant economic impact of the rules on a 
substantial number of small entities.  This would be accomplished by tying 
section 610 review to the Administrative Procedure Act section 553 “notice 
and comment” procedure, and suspending the effect of those rules which 
 
 164. See supra Part III.B. 
 165. In a 1996 paper on periodic review of existing rules, Neil Eisner and Judith Kaleta 
discussed a number of options for periodic review, including periodic “clean up” reviews, 
multiagency reviews, reviews by broad categories, and reviews by affected groups.  See Neil 
R. Eisner & Judith S. Kaleta, Federal Agency Reviews of Existing Regulations, 48 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 139, 160-61 (1996).  Although these categories of review have much to recommend 
them, this paper is focused on changes to existing law which could bring about a legally 
enforceable review requirement, and these categories are not reviewed here. 
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are not thus reopened to public participation within a set time frame.  Such 
a rulemaking would consist of the agency identifying all significant 
regulatory alternatives which would reduce small entity burdens and 
requesting comment on the alternatives.  Since the proposed and final rule 
would be required to comply with section 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the action would also trigger the RFA’s analysis 
requirements. 
This option has a number of benefits.  First, agencies would be forced to 
explain, in a form subject to judicial review, their reasoning as to why rules 
should remain in effect without change.  Currently, agencies are not 
required to publish any final results or explanation of the outcome of a 
section 610 review.166  Hence, most publish nothing on completed reviews, 
and those agencies that do so rarely publish more than a general statement 
that “[t]he agency received no comment on the action and has concluded 
that the rule needs no revisions to minimize impacts on small entities.”167
Second, small entities would be guaranteed an opportunity to provide 
written comments and participate in the review.  Currently, agencies only 
provide one notice that a review will be conducted sometime in the next 
twelve months.
  
In a notice and comment rulemaking, agencies would be held to at least an 
arbitrary and capricious standard that required them to explain why they 
felt no revisions were necessary in the face of industry comments to the 
contrary.  Though this standard is not difficult to meet, current agency 
explanations as to why small entity burden reductions are unnecessary or 
impracticable would probably not even meet the arbitrary and capricious 
standard if used in notice and comment rulemaking. 
168
Third, an agency required to conduct a notice and comment rulemaking 
  Small entities are not aware whether the review is 
scheduled for the following week or the last week of the eleventh month 
after the notice.  Nor are they provided answers to their comments, as 
agencies are not required to publish any formal response.  Agencies are 
unlikely to provide reasonable consideration to public comments to which 
they are not required to respond. 
 
 166. Review under the current section 610 is akin to the long-neglected requirements 
found in some agency manuals ordering periodic reviews with no public input or released 
results.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL 8.2A (1998), available 
at  http://elips.doi.gov/elips/DM_word/3212.doc (“You must review each CFR part at least 
every five years.”) 
 167. EPA Spring 2005 Regulatory Agenda, 70 Fed. Reg. 27,509, 27,615 (May 16, 2005) 
(“Pesticide Worker Protection Standard (WPS) Rule (Completion of a Section 610 
Review)”); see also EPA Fall 2004 Regulatory Agenda, 69 Fed. Reg. 73,875, 73,879 (Dec. 
13, 2004) (listing completed section 610 reviews with no comments). 
 168. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000). 
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is also required to comply with the regulatory flexibility analysis 
requirements of the RFA.  Sections 603 and 604 require agencies to 
evaluate the impacts their actions could have on small entities, unless the 
rule is certified under section 605(b).169
Finally, notice and comment rulemaking requires the commitment of 
resources.  Agencies currently reduce the cost of section 610 review by 
assigning small numbers of otherwise unoccupied staff to review rules.  
Sometimes these staff members are knowledgeable of the ten-year-old rules 
they are reviewing and are thus able to devote adequate consideration to the 
problems small entities are facing, but usually they are not.  The result is 
pro forma review with boilerplate language, inadequate consideration of 
the rule’s impact on regulated small entities, and no agency action to 
reduce small entity regulatory burdens.
  This analysis would ensure that 
agencies attempt to evaluate the current impacts of the rule, as opposed to 
falling back on a pre-rulemaking economic analysis conducted ten years 
prior. 
170  Notice and comment 
rulemaking, on the other hand, exposes the agency to possible legal liability 
and public scrutiny.171
Amending the RFA to order notice and comment rulemaking in section 
610 reviews would not necessarily require large changes.  The section 610 
language of the currently pending legislation could be amended to add the 
following new sections (e) and (f): 
  Agency officials will be forced to assign staff to 
rulemaking who are capable of actually reviewing existing regulations in 
an informed and conscientious manner.  This is no small benefit, and would 
likely prove to be the most important aspect of any notice and comment 
rulemaking requirement. 
(e) The agency shall publish rules to be continued through notice and 
comment rulemaking pursuant to section 553(b) of this title.  The agency 
shall publish in the Federal Register general notices of proposed 
rulemaking and provide interested persons no less than sixty days to 
participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, 
or arguments, with or without opportunity for oral presentation.  In 
addition to any other required information, general notices of proposed 
 
 169. 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 604, 605. 
 170. See supra Part III.B. 
 171. One could argue that noncompliance with section 610 should also result in legal 
liability.  Due to the bare notice requirement of the current section 610, however, no small 
entity is likely to expend the funds necessary to obtain a court order forcing an agency to 
publish a short notice in the Unified Agenda that the rule will be reviewed internally 
sometime within the next twelve months.  Notice and comment rulemaking, on the other 
hand, results in a final, public agency decision and a public administrative record which 
must support the agency’s final decision. 
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rulemaking shall include a section title, “Section 610 Review,” that 
includes: 
(1)  a brief description of the rule, 
(2)  the reason why the agency has determined that it has a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities (without 
regard to whether it had prepared a final regulatory flexibility 
analysis for the rule), and 
(3)  regulatory alternatives the agency is considering with the 
objectives of minimizing any significant economic impacts or 
maximizing any significant beneficial economic impacts on a 
substantial number of small entities. 
(f)  Rules for which the agency has not published a general notice of 
proposed rulemaking upon the expiration of ten years or final rule upon 
the expiration of eleven years from the date of their initial publication in 
the Federal Register shall lapse and become unenforceable.  Provided, an 
agency may continue enforcement of a lapsed rule once for a period of not 
more than twelve months from the publication of a determination in the 
Federal Register stating that the lapse of the rule would have a significant 
negative impact to human health or safety, along with the factual basis for 
such determination. 
Further, as discussed below, section 611 should also be amended to 
include an entirely new sub-section: 
(e) In granting relief in an action alleging violation of section 610 of this 
section, the court shall vacate the rule, prohibit agency enforcement of the 
rule against small entities, and remand it to the agency for notice and 
comment rulemaking.  The court shall not provide for continued 
enforcement of the rule. 
There are a number of considerations which arise with a notice and 
comment rulemaking requirement, which I address below. 
a. Effects of the Recommendation on Agency Resources 
One of the more prevalent arguments forwarded by agency officials in 
response to the current RFA requirement that they at least determine how 
much their rules could cost the regulated public is that their staff and 
budget resources are limited, and that the agency is unable to afford the 
cost of making such estimates.  It does not appear, however, that the 
proposed amendments for section 610 review would necessarily entail large 
agency expenditures. 
First, it must be remembered that section 610’s periodic review 
requirement applies only to those rules which an agency has identified as 
having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
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entities.172  For most agencies, the vast majority of their rules are not 
designated as such (in many cases, properly so).  For example, in the 1993 
regulatory sample discussed in section III, agencies promulgated 309 final 
rules, of which only thirty-seven were accompanied by a determination that 
the rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities.173  The current approach contemplated in House Bill 682 
would require the agency to determine at the time of periodic review 
whether the rule has a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities for purposes of determining whether section 610 review 
was required, and it is likely that agencies would find roughly the same 
proportion of rules to have such impact.174
Second, given agency regulatory goals, the most common outcome for a 
notice and comment requirement would be that the agency would propose 
very few changes.  Subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard, the 
agency would only update its estimates on how the rule is affecting small 
entities, while providing discussion of regulatory alternatives to the status 
quo and defensible reasons for not adopting those alternatives.  This would 
not require the same level of staff time as a substantive amendment to the 
regulation, nor would it likely impose large publication costs.  For those 
few rules which would require in-depth consideration of alternatives and 
adoption of a new regulatory approach, such rules would most likely be 
central to the agency’s core mission and regulatory burdens, and section 
610 review would not be likely to greatly increase their administrative 
costs. 
  Thus, even though it may be 
reasonable to believe that reviewing a rule could impose some costs on 
agencies, the simple fact is that the large majority of agency regulation 
would not trigger section 610 review requirements. 
Finally, even should agencies reasonably believe that amendment of the 
RFA as discussed will impose significant costs in some cases, these costs 
must also be weighed against the nature of agency regulation.  Federal 
agency rules are not industry “best practices.”  They are federal law, and 
must be complied with by those who are regulated.  A violation of these 
rules carries civil and criminal penalties, and small entities with less 
resources than federal agencies can quickly fall into traps for the unwary, 
 
 172. See 5 U.S.C. § 610(a); see also supra Part III.A.2. 
 173. See supra tbl. 1.  The difference becomes even more apparent when the reader takes 
into account the fact that the sample includes twenty-one separate notices from HHS for 
what appears to be one very large food labeling action.  See supra note 88. 
 174. H.R. 682, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005) (proposing § 610(e), mandating agencies to 
publish a list of rules with significant economic impacts to substantial numbers of small 
entities, without regard to whether they were accompanied by final regulatory flexibility 
analyses when originally published). 
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where they will not be permitted to plead that determination of their 
responsibilities under the rules would have cost too much.  As Congress 
ultimately concluded during its consideration of the RFA: 
The Committee is aware that the workload of some agencies may increase 
during rulemaking.  Such temporary increases in costs to the government 
must be seen in the perspective of long-run reductions in cost to the 
society, however.  An agency which ignores less burdensome alternatives, 
conversely, is in effect, putting a substantial cost upon certain individuals 
and groups in the society.175
Thus, citing the fundamental unfairness of a situation where agency 
officials claim to lack the funds to determine the effects of their actions, 
Congress enacted the RFA and chose to prohibit willful blindness.  It 
appears that even if the RFA should impose some costs on some agencies 
for a handful of contentious rules, the agencies should respect Congress’ 
expressed will, and ensure that their actions do not unnecessarily harm 
those who are least able to protect themselves. 
 
b. Effects of the Recommendation on the Predictability of Regulation 
One interesting concern brought up by a solid periodic review 
requirement is the role of predictability in the regulation of industry.  A 
rule may require large equipment or capital expenditures upfront, with 
costs to be recovered slowly over the course of twenty or more years.  
Again, a prominent example of a long-term regulatory requirement with 
significant initial sunk costs is the recent nonroad diesel emissions rule 
promulgated by the EPA.176  This rule is estimated to cost engine and 
equipment manufacturers approximately $1.3 billion in fixed costs, mainly 
in retooling and redesign.177  EPA weighs these costs over the agency’s 
estimate of “recovered” costs over a period of thirty years.178  If, after ten 
years, EPA was required to reopen the rulemaking to public comment, and 
the evidence showed that those capital expenditures were not likely to 
reduce emissions, or that the types of pollution being reduced were not 
actually as harmful as EPA had originally assumed, and EPA eliminated 
the requirements, companies that had expended large amounts of capital at 
the outset of the rule would be in a greatly reduced competitive position to 
companies which had not.179
 
 175. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 9 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2796. 
 
 176. EPA, CONTROL OF EMISSIONS, supra note 36, at 6-74, 77. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Although it may seem an ancillary concern, it could be important.  After all, an 
agency such as EPA, faced with a new periodic review requirement, may decide that the 
SEE_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:25 PM 
2006] FEDERAL AGENCIES’ FAILURE  145 
We must balance the concept of fair regulation of industries with the 
underlying economic principles behind the feel-good goal of forcing the 
government to refrain from imposing unnecessary burdens on small 
entities.  Judged from the point of view of existing companies, it would be 
a fundamentally unfair market if they were forced to endure round after 
round of massive capital expenditures which agencies later reduced, giving 
competitors a cost advantage.  The concept of free and competitive 
markets, however, forces us to balance the economics of government 
regulation.  It is true that the RFA operates to force agencies to consider the 
complaints of existing small entities of the type that commonly contact 
their congressmen, and are glad to have the legal protections of the RFA 
for their constituents.  Protecting existing small entities, however, is not the 
RFA’s only goal.  Rather, the RFA operates as an important check to 
government-produced barriers to market entry, and keeps our free markets 
competitive and open to future entrepreneurs.180
Additionally, as a practical matter, protecting competition may serve to 
protect small entities.  Agencies do not regulate only small entities, but 
entire industries.  Generally, small firms represent over ninety-nine percent 
of all firms, but due to their sheer size, the small proportion of large firms 
actually account for almost half of nonfarm private gross domestic 
product.
 
181
Thus, the concept of predictability requires serious consideration.  
Removing regulatory burdens after the expenditure of capital costs would 
work a fundamental unfairness to the small entities that choose to stay in a 
market, and may serve as a disincentive to them to stay when faced with 
large regulatory costs.  Allowing agencies to consider their existing 
  Allowing existing market players to claim the need for 
predictability allows agencies to impose eternal high-cost regulations, and 
has potential to allow large players to spread regulatory costs and prohibit 
any entrepreneurial small firm from entering that market.  This may not 
only allow large firms to dominate industries due to their ability to better 
spread regulatory costs, but it could hurt consumers by giving those large 
firms more market power than they would have had if small company entry 
were possible.  Regulation serves as a way to protect large firms from the 
smaller firms nipping at their heels. 
 
best way to impose regulatory requirements would be to impose the maximum amount of 
regulatory costs immediately, rather than spread them over a term of years in which the 
agency is not sure that it will be authorized to regulate. 
 180. See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT.  SCI. 3, 7-9 (1971) (discussing capture of regulation by rail carriers to erect barriers 
to entry for new trucking entrants). 
 181. Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions 1 (2005), 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf. 
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regulatory burden on industry as the “baseline,” however, could erect 
barriers to entry by smaller firms who are not capable of spreading large 
regulatory costs, and thus cause harm to both small entities and consumers. 
The author believes that large-scale agency vacation of existing 
regulatory standards is unlikely, regardless of whether agencies are 
required to engage in notice and comment rulemaking.  Agencies should be 
expected to reduce burdens somewhat, but any regulatory relief would 
probably not reach the level that would cause small entities to believe they 
were unfairly forced to expend capital, or dissuade small entities from 
remaining in markets upon learning of new regulation.  Moreover, 
meaningful review with public participation, of the sort that would be 
guaranteed by notice and comment rulemaking, would bring such 
competition issues to light. 
c. Timing Considerations in Notice and Comment Rulemaking 
One important factor to consider in any notice and comment rulemaking 
requirement would be timing.  Has ten years proven to be a reasonable time 
frame for review, or would some other time frame be more appropriate?  
Also, section 610 currently states that agencies must conduct review ten 
years after the rule is published as final.182  Many rules, however, such as 
the EPA nonroad diesel rule discussed above, are implemented over the 
course of many years, and regulatory burdens are sometimes not being 
imposed until close to the time when the agency would be required to 
conduct its ten year section 610 review.183
Ten years appears to be an appropriate time frame for current reform 
efforts.  Using the language proposed here for amending section 610(b) to 
clarify when the review period begins tolling, it would appear that a large 
numbers of rules exist which would be required to be reviewed and would 
likely occupy agency review personnel for the foreseeable future.
  Should agencies be forced to 
review rules that have only been in effect for a year or two, or would it be 
too confusing to tie the review period to dates that burdens are imposed? 
184
 
 182. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2000). 
  Also, 
ten years may seem like a long timeframe, but it is useful because a long 
timeframe guarantees that any evolution of the regulation which could 
occur has already done so.  While it could be argued that after five or seven 
 183. For example, the EPA’s nonroad diesel emissions rule was promulgated on June 29, 
2004, and required major reductions in particulate matter emissions from nonroad diesel 
engines between twenty-five and seventy-five horsepower beginning in 2013.  See EPA 
Final Rule: Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 
69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, 38,971 (June 29, 2004). 
 184. See supra Part VI.A. 
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years, the rule’s impacts on small entities would be clear, after ten years, 
almost all changes in compliance burdens due to litigation and agency 
interpretations of a rule would surely have occurred.  For the time being, 
ten years would seem an appropriate time frame for review. 
As far as when the ten-year period should begin, it appears that 
publication may be the best compromise.  It makes little sense to require a 
periodic review of a regulatory burden that has only been in effect a year or 
two.  The rule’s effects are not yet quantifiable, small entities may not even 
be aware of the rule’s requirements, and the regulation may experience 
significant evolution due to agency interpretation or litigation that reduces 
or increases its effects on small entities dramatically.  Yet, it is difficult to 
state that section 610 review should be conducted separately for individual 
regulations on the event of their ten-year anniversaries.  While it is usually 
not a persuasive argument to claim that agencies should not be required to 
conduct reviews due to limited resources, neither should the agencies be 
required to conduct annual reviews for a single rulemaking, budgeting for 
separate personnel to conduct each one, opening and closing comment 
periods one after the other, and generally wasting the taxpayers’ money on 
something that could have been done over the course of a few years.  One 
review for each rulemaking would appear appropriate, to be completed ten 
years after the publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. 
2.   Notice and Comment Rulemaking in Response to a Petition  
As discussed above, mandatory notice and comment rulemaking in 
response to section 610 reviews appears to be the only way to ensure 
meaningful public participation, and such public reviews would not likely 
present an unreasonable drain on agency resources.  Should it appear, 
however, that such an option would be overly burdensome or if it proves 
likely to lead to regulatory mayhem, a variation on the idea could solve 
concerns.  Instead of requiring notice and comment every ten years for 
every rulemaking which the agency determines has a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities, section 610 could be 
revised to require notice and comment only in such cases where sufficient 
interest exists to petition the agency for rulemaking.  Such an option would 
appear to be useful because it would: (1) reduce the number of rules treated 
thusly, and hence, the cost to the reviewing agency, and (2) ensure public 
participation for those rules which imposed sufficient burden on small 
entities to petition for its change. 
This option would appear to address any agency cost concerns about 
opening section 610 reviews for public participation.  As discussed above, 
only a small percentage of rules each year are found by agencies to have 
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significant economic impacts to a substantial number of small entities.185  
Should this subset of rules be further limited to those rules for which the 
agency receives a petition for notice and comment, it is likely that the 
number of petitions in any given year would be quite small.  It is instructive 
to note the relatively small number of rules involved in responses to 
OIRA’s calls for regulatory reform proposals.186
Second, an option involving a basic petition based on specific 
parameters would ensure that all issues with valid small entity concerns 
were publicly addressed by an agency.  The current APA petition process 
would not ensure that agencies actually allow for public participation in 
any more rulemakings than they already do, mainly because of the cost of 
the process and the narrow standard of review for agency denials of such 
petitions.
  Since many of the 
proposals for reform received by OIRA over the past four years involve 
rules which do not significantly affect small entities, agencies would be 
likely to receive even fewer requests based on a revised section 610 than 
they already currently receive through OIRA’s regulatory reform process. 
187
An interesting question attached to this option is the following: Who 
would actually petition agencies for the section 610 notice and comment 
rulemaking?  One possibility would be to simply adopt a provision similar 
to the APA, allowing any party to petition the agency for section 610 notice 
and comment process.
  By adopting a standard form for petitions, and making it 
mandatory for agencies to respond to such petitions with opportunities for 
public participation, section 610 could ensure that agencies conduct 
meaningful reviews of existing regulations. 
188
 
 185. See supra Part III.A.2. 
  This would ensure the maximum number of 
affected small entities had an opportunity to make themselves heard.  
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66. 
 187. See e.g., WWHT v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 656 F.2d 807, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(“[T]he decision to institute rulemaking is one that is largely committed to the discretion of 
the agency, and . . .  the scope of review of such a determination must, of necessity, be very 
narrow.”).  Further, it is possible that small entities that did not participate in rulemakings 
conducted more than ten years prior could later be blocked from raising arguments central to 
the rulemaking in their petition.  See, e.g., Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 513 F.2d 
1045, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is incumbent ‘upon an interested person to act 
affirmatively to protect himself’ in administrative proceedings, and ‘such a person should 
not be entitled to sit back and wait until all interested persons who do so act have been 
heard, and then complain that he has not been properly treated.’”) (quoting Red River 
Broad. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 98 F.2d 282, 286 (1938)); Henley v. FDA, 873 F. Supp. 
776, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing to Nader in dicta, concluding that citizen petition brought 
six years after completed rulemaking “essentially sought review” of a rule for which the 
citizen did not originally participate). 
 188. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition 
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”) 
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Limiting the petition right to an advocate for small business, however, 
could have the effect of focusing the advocate’s attention on the petition 
process and ensuring that at least one entity developed expertise in the 
petition process.  By designating an established small entity advocate, such 
as the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA, section 610 could ensure 
active pursuit of small entity reviews by an office of advocates who are in 
continuous contact with regulated small entities.  Either option appears to 
have benefits, and neither presents any significant drawback, yet the option 
of investing a permanent office within the federal government with the 
responsibility and authority to file petitions for rulemaking on behalf of 
small entities could be a slightly more reliable guarantee. 
Hence, a slightly altered section 610(e) (with potential changes from the 
language previously proposed in italics) would begin: 
(e)  Within one year of receipt of a petition from the chief counsel for 
advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration, the agency shall 
publish rules to be continued through notice and comment rulemaking 
pursuant to section 553(b) of this title.189
To reflect the difference between a ten-year mandatory review and a 
review in response to petition, the proposed section (f) from Part VI.B.1 
would also be revised (with potentially revised language in italics): 
 
(f)  Rules for which the agency has not published a general notice of 
proposed rulemaking within 180 days and a final rule within twelve 
months of receipt of a petition for rulemaking from the chief counsel for 
advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration shall lapse and 
become unenforceable.  Provided, an agency may continue enforcement 
of a lapsed rule once for a period of not more than twelve months from 
the publication of a determination in the Federal Register stating that the 
lapse of the rule would have a significant negative impact to human health 
or safety, along with the factual basis for such determination.190
This Article does not recommend a provision for notice and comment 
periodic reviews only in response to petitions.  As discussed above, such 
petition-driven reviews would likely result in confusion and agency non-
compliance, and notice and comment reviews would not overly tax agency 
resources. 
 
3. Public Participation Through Mandatory Small Entity Review Panels 
One way to ensure public participation would be the introduction of 
small entity review panels for purposes of periodic review.  Without 
 
 189. Cf. supra Part VI.B.1. 
 190. Cf. supra Part VI.B.1. 
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concurrent adoption of notice and comment process in section 610 periodic 
reviews, however, such panels would be likely to waste agency resources 
and unlikely to result in regulatory burden reduction. 
In 1996, Congress amended the RFA to require two agencies to conduct 
small entity review panels for proposed rules.191  These panels consist of 
the agency, as well as representatives of the SBA’s Office of Advocacy and 
OIRA, and are advised by small entity representatives from the affected 
industries.  These panels review pre-decisional proposals for regulation and 
make recommendations for revisions to reduce small entity burdens, which 
are indirectly judicially reviewable.192
As discussed above, GAO’s study of more than fifty federal agencies 
identified six that consistently had more than ten entries per year that were 
identified as likely to impose significant economic impacts on a substantial 
number of small entities.
 
193  Specifically, the GAO identified the 
Departments of Commerce, the Interior, Treasury, and Health and Human 
Services, the Small Business Administration, the Federal Communications 
Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.194
This idea has merit, but also presents a number of problems.  First, small 
entity review panels consume vast agency resources, and would likely 
overwhelm not only the agencies, but also the small staffs of both the 
SBA’s Office of Advocacy and OIRA.
  Singling 
out these agencies, in a fashion similar to 1996 RFA amendments’ 
treatment of small entity review panels, would reduce potentially 
unnecessary administrative burdens to less active agencies while ensuring 
that the majority of rulemakings have some public participation and reach 
judicially reviewable and public decisions. 
195
 
 191. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-121, § 
244(a), 110 Stat. 847, 867-68 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 609 (1996)). 
  As federal personnel became 
less able to devote time to the panels, small entity review panels could lose 
their main recommending benefit, which is that they provide for the in-
 192. 5 U.S.C. §§ 609(b), 611(a) (2000). 
 193. GAO, AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 82, at 13-14. 
 194. Id. at 14. 
 195. This is a serious concern.  For example, the Office of Advocacy currently has fewer 
than fifteen attorneys devoted to reviewing every federal agency’s compliance with the 
RFA, who handle less than a handful of small entity review panels each year.  See Office of 
Advocacy, Small Bus. Admin., Advocacy Staff List, available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/staff.html.  OIRA has a similar level of staffing.  GAO, 
RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE 
TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 19, fig.2 (2003) (“Organization of OIRA”), available at 
http://www.gao.gov (search “GAO-03-929”).  This would not appear to be an adequate 
staffing level to absorb the responsibility of dozens of additional panels without drastically 
reducing the level of participation each office currently provides. 
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depth exchange of technical and economic data between small entities and 
agency officials. 
Second, without an attached rulemaking, small entity review panels 
would be simple collectors of information, issuing a report which has no 
meaning and could not be meaningfully reviewed by a court.  Currently, 
the small entity review panel reviews a regulatory approach the agency has 
not yet published as a proposed rule.  The panel serves as a check on the 
rule before it is made public.  If there is no regulatory approach being 
considered, and no required post-panel rulemaking, the panel itself 
becomes an academic exercise, unlikely to spur agency action.  In addition, 
small entity representatives would be hesitant to devote resources to such 
an exercise.  Granted, the RFA could be amended to also require a notice 
and comment rulemaking, but this begs the following question: If the 
agency is already required to open the rule to public participation through 
notice and comment rulemaking, is a small entity review panel going to 
provide for justifiably increased small entity participation? 
Third, even though GAO identified six agencies as particularly active, 
other agencies occasionally impose massive burdens on small entities.  For 
example, one of the smallest federal agencies, the Architectural and 
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (“Access Board”), sets the 
architectural standards that small entities must attain in public 
accommodations and commercial facilities to be considered accessible 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.196  The agency regulates very 
infrequently, but when it does adjust its standards, regulated industries 
estimate that the Access Board’s rule changes could cost billions of dollars 
to small entities.197
 
 196. 29 U.S.C. § 792(b)(3) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (2000). 
  Expanding the panel requirement to all agencies would 
completely overwhelm both the Office of Advocacy and OIRA.  A petition 
provision could require an agency to convene a small entity review panel in 
response to petitions, but such petitions would be unlikely to be used, as the 
current lack of petitions for section 610 review can attest.  Given the 
questions which would remain as to the implementation and cost of small 
entity review panels for the purpose of periodic review, it would appear 
more cost-effective, and in keeping with the burden-reduction goals of the 
RFA, to introduce a basic requirement for the notice and comment process, 
rather than to expand section 609’s review panel requirement into the realm 
 197. See Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. 
Admin., to Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice (May 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/doj05_0523.pdf (discussing the potential costs of 
the rule and citing to industry studies). 
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of periodic review.  Should Congress later determine that notice and 
comment procedures were not encouraging agencies to reduce regulatory 
burdens, small entity review panels could be added to existing notice and 
comment process in periodic reviews. 
4. Combined Section 610 and Paperwork Reduction Act Reviews into 
Single Interagency Review Overseen by Both OMB and the SBA’s Office of 
Advocacy 
A third possible reform proposal to ensure public participation arises 
from the need to ensure that agencies conduct meaningful reviews of rules, 
and act when necessary, but stay within budget parameters.  Notice and 
comment rulemaking, as described in option one, is open to the public, and 
is likely to result in policy decisions that properly balance competing 
interests.  Notice and comment rulemaking can be expensive in some cases, 
however, and could require major devotion of agency resources for the 
purposes of periodic review.  If a more streamlined and less costly 
approach could be found which did not sacrifice too much public 
participation, such an option might be preferable to notice and comment 
rulemaking.  One possible solution could be to tie section 610 reviews to 
reviews already being conducted by OMB under its information collection 
request renewal process, but this idea does not seem to bear out on further 
examination. 
OMB is required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) to 
review existing regulatory paperwork burdens with an eye towards 
minimizing them.198  To this end, OMB’s regulations require agencies to 
resubmit their information collection requests to OMB review and public 
comment every three years.199  During this process, OMB reviews the rule 
for at least sixty days.  Further, agencies are required to make a “reasonable 
effort” to seek public comment prior to submitting the collection of 
information to OMB for review, and must publish a notice in the Federal 
Register at the same time the rule is sent to OMB, requesting the public’s 
input and directing it to OMB.200
Incorporating section 610 reviews into this process could help to ensure 
that section 610 reviews are meaningful and public.  OMB’s ample 
oversight authority under the PRA, and its expertise in reviewing agency 
regulatory alternatives under Executive Order 12,866 could make it an 
 
 
 198. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. § 3504 (2000). 
 199. OMB Controlling Paperwork Burdens on the Public, 5 C.F.R. §§ 1320.11(j) (2006) 
(restricting collection of information approvals to three years in duration), 1320.12(e)(1) 
(setting the length of a collection of information renewal at three years). 
 200. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1320.12(a)(2), 1320.12(c). 
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effective and helpful partner in section 610 review.  Also, by combining the 
notice requirement of OMB’s PRA review with a notice of section 610 
review, agencies would provide effective notice that a section 610 review 
was imminent.  Finally, the SBA’s Office of Advocacy, an office that 
works closely with small business groups, would represent small business 
concerns during any interagency discussions on the section 610 review.  
The review periods do not match perfectly (three years for the PRA201 and 
ten for the RFA202
There are multiple drawbacks, however, to such an approach.  First and 
foremost, without further regulation by OMB, there would be no 
requirement that agencies issue final regulatory actions in response to 
section 610 reviews.  Agencies could continue to perform section 610 
reviews without public participation. 
), but the difference is minor, as initiating a section 610 
review in the ninth year of a rule’s effectiveness would ensure that rules did 
not exceed ten years of effectiveness before they were reviewed. 
Second, should small entities feel that the final product (or lack of final 
product) of such a review was arbitrary or capricious, there is no recourse 
under the PRA for judicial review.203  This is no minor matter, as agencies 
routinely ignored the RFA’s requirements until it was amended in 1996 to 
provide small entities with the express authority to make a claim against an 
agency.204
Third, though the Office of Advocacy’s involvement could help 
represent small entity interests in the interagency review process, that 
process would remain confidential and exempt from the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).  All documents produced during the discussions 
would presumably remain out of the reach of the public, and under FOIA, 
OMB and the Office of Advocacy would be prohibited from sharing with 
the public the actual regulatory alternatives the agency put forward without 
the agency’s express written authorization.
 
205
 
 201. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(g) (2000). 
 
 202. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a). 
 203. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(6) (“The decision by the Director [of the Office of Management 
and Budget] to approve or not act upon a collection of information contained in an agency 
rule shall not be subject to judicial review.”); see also Tozzi v. EPA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47-
48 (D.D.C. 2001) (dismissing a challenge to an Information Collection Request approval 
decision, citing statutory bar to review). 
 204.  See, e.g., Unanimous Consent Request, 142 CONG. REC. S1636-01, S1637 (Mar. 7, 
1996) (statement of Senator Bond in support of scheduling a vote on the 1996 SBREFA 
amendments to the RFA, concluding that, “[r]egulatory agencies have routinely ignored the 
impact on small business . . . .  We need to give them some enforcement powers so that they 
will be heard.”), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/bb_s1636.html. 
 205. See Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(agency documents forwarded to OMB for approval were subject to deliberative process 
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Fourth, the PRA and Executive Order 12,866 do not appear to grant 
OMB sufficient authority in the case of independent regulatory agencies, 
such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  The PRA itself provides that an independent 
agency can override an OMB disapproval of an information collection.206  
Further, these agencies are not subject to OMB review under Executive 
Order 12,866.207
Finally, such an approach would be of limited value for rules that do not 
impose paperwork burdens and are not subject to regular review under the 
PRA.  For example, environmental restrictions on development or 
requirements to make public facilities handicapped-accessible may not 
require approvals of collections of information, as no information is 
actually collected.  In both instances, however, small entities would still 
shoulder regulatory burdens subject to section 610 review. 
 
This option has much to recommend it, in that it offers partners with 
sufficient expertise to oversee agency compliance with section 610.  Also, 
the existing public notice process for PRA review could be adapted to 
include section 610 notices for better public participation at reduced costs 
from stand-alone agency section 610 notices.  The approach’s many 
shortcomings, however, not the least of which being that the PRA does not 
apply to all agency actions, means that it would be better to ensure public 
participation through an APA public notice and comment procedure, rather 
than through PRA’s information collection review procedure.  Therefore, 
this Article does not recommend this option as a stand-alone response to 
agency failures to reduce regulatory burdens, though OIRA’s PRA reviews 
and periodic reviews could be combined with the recommended notice and 
comment periodic review to ensure that federal officers outside the 
regulatory agencies participated more fully in the periodic review process. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article attempts to describe the widespread agency noncompliance 
with section 610 of the RFA, analyze current efforts to reform the 
provision, and put forth several methods for improving agency compliance 
and reduction of small entity regulatory burdens.  House Bill 682 and 
Senate Bill 1388 represent reasonable efforts to solve problems with 
 
privilege and not properly released); see generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FOIA Guide: 
Deliberative Process Privilege (2004), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/exemption5.htm#deliberative. 
 206. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(f) (2000). 
 207. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,737 (Sept. 30, 1993) 
(exempting independent agencies, defined in then-44 U.S.C. § 3502(10)). 
Comment [XP1]: Can you clarify the assertion 
being made here?  I find it a little confusing… 
SEE_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:25 PM 
2006] FEDERAL AGENCIES’ FAILURE  155 
widespread agency refusal to complete section 610 reviews, and bear 
promise for reforming the contents of the small entity periodic review.  The 
additional amendments recommended in this Article include: (1) 
clarification of the time when a rule must be reviewed to eliminate 
confusion concerning the effects of subsequent amendment on a final rule’s 
periodic review, and (2) requiring notice and comment rulemaking for 
continuation of rules through periodic review, attached to a concrete 
timetable for such review.  The adoption of House Bill 682 and Senate Bill 
1388, along with the additional recommendations made here, will 
invigorate the periodic review requirement of the RFA, and ensure that 
agencies rationally evaluate their existing regulatory burden on American 
small business. 
 
